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Precedents as a Source of Land 
Law in Poland’s Past1∗
Our law is founded more on custom et in communi praxi, for which 
examples are to be found in the decrees of kings, the forebears of His 
Majesty ultimarum instantiarum, rather than in writing.  
Jan Łączyński, Kompendium sądów Króla Jegomości, 1594
The State of Research
Among the sources from which Polish land law derives, one distin-
guishes two foremost ones: consuetudo and lex. In modern times, that is 
since the sixteenth century, the latter occurs in our law under the name 
of constitutio, which was enacted by the Sejm, though other designa-
tions also happened to be employed.2 The predominance of custom and 
1 Translated from: B. Lesiński, Prejudykaty jako źródło prawa ziemskiego w dawnej Polsce, 
“Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne” 1990, 42, pp. 9-49 by Szymon Nowak and proofread by 
Stephen Dersley. The translation and proofreading were financed by the Ministry of Science 
and Higher Education under 848/2/P-DUN/2018. This article was written by the author on 
the basis of his work Podstawowe problemy prawne likwidacji skutków wojny 1939–1945 
a dwa państwa niemieckie. Chapter 5 of the monograph, Umowa poczdamska a traktat po-
koju z Niemcami offers a number of major comparative conclusions presented in this article. 
The author also draws on his monograph Umowa poczdamska z dnia 2 VIII 1945, Warszawa 
1960, p. 629, which was updated twice for the purpose of publishing it in English (1963) and 
French (1964). On account of a thorough source documentation in the published monograph 
and because a new work is going to be published soon, the author forgoes—having approval 
of the Editorial Board—the convention of scholarly referencing in this article. 
2 S. Grodziski, Sejm dawnej Rzeczypospolitej jako najwyższy organ ustawodawczy. Konsty-
tucje sejmowe — pojęcie i próba systematyki, “Czasopimo Prawno-Historyczne” 1983, 
vol. XXXV, fasc. 1, pp. 168–169.
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statutes as fontes iuris oriundi seems so obvious that we tend to forget 
that other sources of land law existed as well. And yet the awareness of 
a greater variety of sources was not altogether alien to past legal authors. 
Describing the ways in which laws were established among Poles in his 
Institutiones, Tomasz Drezner lists not only constitutio and consuetudo 
but, in the chapter entitled De aliis iuris constituendis modis apud Po-
lonos, mentions other factors as well. According to the author, the latter 
include decrees (judicial rulings);3 Drezner also recognized the possibil-
ity of applying analogy, noting that: — denique ex contitutionibus si-
milibus, ad similes casus incidentes proceditur.4 Also, there is evidence 
that legal lacunae arising due to lack of pertinent provisions was to be 
rectified in early Polish law by regulations formulated under the prin-
ciple of equity (aequitas).5 Still, the various law-building factors cited 
here receive little attention in our scholarly literature. 
This paper sets out to revisit and inquire more extensively into the 
importance of judicial rulings as sources of land law in Poland.6 It does 
not aspire to be the conclusive and complete study of the issue, but it 
does collate material which even now may serve to gain better insights 
into the problem. Let us note that in the latest synthesis of the history 
of Polish statehood and law, court judgments are hardly ever mentioned 
3 T. Drezner, Institutionum iuris Regni Poloniae libri quatuor, Zamość 1613, pp. 10–11, 
Hereinafter: Institutiones; Cf. K. Bukowska, T. Drezner, Polski romanista XVII wieku i jego 
znaczenie dla nauki prawa, Warszawa 1960, pp. 103–104. The text relating to decrees is 
cited below in footnote 60.
4 T. Drezner, op.cit.
5 Ł. Górnicki, Rozmowa Polaka z Włochem o wolnościach i prawach polskich, in: Pisma, ed. 
R. Pollak, vol. II, Wrszawa 1961, p. 408: But those jurists of yours tell you to resort to ad 
equitatem only when ius scriptum fails. Aequitas was also referred to by S. Sarnicki.
6 The importance of precedents in municipal law also awaits a thorough study. As we know, 
the decisions of the higher courts (ortyle) played the role of precedents in municipal law 
(S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł dawnego prawa polskiego, vol. II, Lvov 1925, p. 214), but 
the observation is all too general. We do not know whether those were ortyle or precedents 
in the distinct yet broader sense that B. Groicki had in mind when he wrote that Saxons and 
Poles with respect to municipal law: also judge sometimes in accordance with age-old cus-
tom or a similar case which had earlier taken place before the court. B. Groicki, Porządek 
sądów i spraw miejskich prawa majdeburskiego w Koronie Polskiej, “Biblioteka Dawnych 
Polskich Pisarzy Prawników” vol. I, Warszawa 1953, pp. 25–26.
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as sources of law.7 Z. Rymaszewski stated recently that “the issue of 
the precedential nature of judicial rulings in Poland is little explored.”8 
The problem remains uninvestigated even though it has been referred to, 
even addressed directly and analyzed, but the scope of inquiry has been 
for the most part very narrow. The views on how precedents functioned 
in land law tended to vary as well. 
The researchers who (in the nineteenth century) studied the statutes 
of Kazimierz Wielki, wondered whether the so-called precedents in 
the Lesser Polish compendium had derived from the actual judgments 
of courts.9 Many of them believed that they did indeed originate from 
judicial practice, but no reliable evidence to that effect was provided. 
J. Lelewel found them to have been judgments made under Władysław 
Łokietek at sąd wiecowy (higher court colloquia),10 A. Stadnicki also 
maintained that the precedents contained in the statutes derived from 
judicial practice, going as far as to assert that they were formulated 
at the colloquium of 1347.11 The most comprehensive argument to 
prove the judicial provenance of those precedents was advanced by 
F. Piekosiński, who claimed—without any evidence to support this—
that the precedents reflect the rulings made during sessions of the Lesser 
Polish sąd wiecowy after 1362.12 In a somewhat later treatise he con-
7 J. Bardach ed., Historia państwa i prawa Polski, 2nd edition, vol. I, Warszawa 1964 and 
Z. Kaczmarczyk, B. Leśnodorski ed., Historia państwa i prawa Polski, Warszawa 1966. It 
is only in vol. I that one can find one general statements concerning the role of precedent in 
the period of early feudal monarchy. J. Bardach ed., op.cit., p. 159.
8 Z. Rymaszewski, Instrukcje syndyków gdańskich w sprawach rozpoznawanych przed 
sądami zadwornymi (od końca XVI do połowy XVIII w.), “Czasopismo Prawno-Historyc-
zne” 1985, vol. XXXVIII, fasc. 2, p. 201107.
9 An overview of such opinions may be found in S. Roman, Geneza statutów Kazimierza 
Wielkiego, Kraków 1961, pp. 96–102.
10 J. Lelewel, Krytyczny rozbiór statutu wiślickiego, in: Polska wieków średnich, 
vol. III, Poznań 1859, pp. 300- 301.
11 A. Stadnicki, Przegląd krytyczny rozporządzeń tzw. statutu wiślickiego podług przedmiotów 
ułożonych, Warszawa 1860, pp. 68, 244, 279.
12 F. Piekosiński, Uwagi nad ustawodawstwem wiślicko-piotrkowskim króla Kazimierza 
Wielkiego, “Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności. Wydział historyczno-filozoficzny” 1892, 
vol. 28, pp. 231–233.
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sidered it almost a certainty.13 Only R. Hube, speaking in favour of the 
judicial provenance of precedents in the debate concerning statutes, was 
able to cite factual instances of judicial precedents in medieval Poland 
and their use in drafting legal compilations.14
Next to R. Hube, there were more nineteenth-century scholars who 
approached the question of precedents as sources of early Polish law in 
a rational manner, attempting to provide evidence in favour or against 
it. No longer as part of the debate on the statutes, Hube was joined by 
M. Bobrzyński15 and O. Balzer16, both of whom supported the thesis that 
precedents constituted a source of land law. 
Nevertheless, opposing views were also expressed. J. W. Bandtkie 
was of the opinion that the provision on judicial rulings in the 1454 
Statutes of Nieszawa (analyzed in greater detail further on in this text) 
had no major significance and that “prejudices”, as Bandtkie called 
precedents, did not serve to create new law.17 A. Z. Helcel also devoted 
some attention to the question in his unfinished and otherwise excel-
lent work on Polish law18, assuming a position similar to Bandtkie’s. 
According to Helcel, judicial decisions were not considered law that 
13 Writing: (…) namely, I have demonstrated (in Remarks) that precedents may only have 
emerged in the era of the colloquium courts, F. Piekosiński, Jeszcze słowo o ustawodawstwie 
wiślicko-piotrkowskim króla Kazimierza Wielkiego, “Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności. 
Wydział historyczno-filozoficzny” 1896, vol. 33, p. 127.
14 In a paper delivered in 1853 R. Hube drew on the role of precedents with regard to Con-
stitutiones et iura terrae Lanciciensis. R. Hube, Przyczynek do objaśnienia historii statutu 
wiślickiego, in: Pisma, vol. II, Warszawa 1905, pp. 276–277.
15 M. Bobrzyński expressed his opinion in the preface to Decreta in iudiciis regalibus tempore 
Sigismundi I. regis Poloniae a. 1507–1531 Cracoviae celebratis lata, “Starodawne Prawa 
Polskiego Pomniki” vol. VI, pp. 11, 460, Hereinafter: Decreta or D. and in the introduction 
to Puncta in iudiciis terrestribus et castrensibus observanda anno 1544 conscripta, “Staro-
dawne Prawa Polskiego Pomniki” vol. VII, fasc. 2, pp. 202–203 Hereinafter: Puncta.
16 O. Balzer, Geneza Trybunału Koronnego, Warszawa 1886, p. 327; O. Balzer, Uwagi 
o prawie zwyczajowym i ustawniczym w Polsce, in: Studia nad prawem polskim, Poznań 
1889, pp. 96–97, 106–107, 110.
17 J. W. Bandtkie-Stężyński, Prawo prywatne polskie, Warszawa 1891, pp. V-VI.
18 A. Z. Helcel, Dawne prawo prywatne polskie, Kraków 1874, written 1849–1853, p. 21f. 
Working on his synthesis P. Dąbkowski found that among the works of his predecessors 
only Helcel’s “met the requirements of modern science to the greatest extent” P. Dąbkowski 
Prawo prywatne polskie, vol. I-II, Lvov 1910–1911, p. 68 I.
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applied universally, as evidenced by numerous constitutions of the 
Sejm which were aimed against precedents. Helcel recognized prec-
edents to have been no more than guidelines for judges who—accord-
ing to somewhat self-contradictory observation of the author—were 
obligated to “judge similar cases consistently as they had earlier been 
judged.” W. Dutkiewicz was also inclined to agree that judicial rulings 
had not been sources of law.19 
Later scholars spoke on various occasions either for or against 
the existence and applicability of precedents, though they attached 
varied degrees of importance to the latter. Authors who wrote on the 
subject include B. Grużewski20, M. Goyski21, P. Dąbkowski22, J. Ma-
karewicz23, S. Kutrzeba24, S. Estreicher25, J. Michalski26, S. Roman27, 
H. Grajewski28, W. Maisel29, and Z. Rymaszewski.30 We need not sum-
marize their observations at this point, especially given that they were 
often highly marginal. Recently, this Journal featured a paper devot-
19 W. Dutkiewicz, Prawa cywilne jakie w Polsce od roku 1347 do wprowadzenia Kodeksu 
Napoleona obowiązywały, Warszawa 1809, p. 14. Dutkiewicz expressed a similar view in 
other works as well, cf. J. Michalski, Studia nad reformą sądownictwa i prawa sądowego 
w XVIII w., Part 1, Wrocław–Warszawa 1958, p. 29039.
20 B. Grużewski, Sądownictwo królewskie w pierwszej połowie rządów Zygmunta Starego, 
“SHPP” vol. II, fasc. 4, Lvov 1906, pp. 77–78, 100–101.
21 M. Goyski, Reformy trybunału koronnego, “Przegląd Prawa i Administracji” 1909, XXX-
IV, pp. 307–308, 664–665.
22 P. Dąbkowski, op.cit., p. 44.
23 J. Makarewicz, Polskie prawo karne. Część ogólna, Lvov—Warszawa 1019, pp. 12–14.
24 S. Kutrzeba, Preface, in: Cautelae quaedam in iure terrestri tentae et observatae, “Archi-
wum Komisji Prawniczej”, vol. IX, pp. 200, 207–209; also in: Historia źródeł, vol. I, pp. 
157–158, 268–270.
25 S. Estreicher, Kultura prawnicza w Polsce XVI wieku, in: Kultura staropolska, Kraków 
1932, pp. 68, 79, 101,
26 J. Michalski, op.cit., pp. 83, 180, 200–210, 290–291,
27 S. Roman, op.cit., p. 100.
28 H. Grajewski, Prawo zwyczajowe w Leges seu statuta ac privilegia Regni Poloniae omnia 
Jakuba Przyłuskiego, “Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. Nauki Humanistyczno-
Społeczne” 1967, series 1, vol. 82, pp. 122–123, 140, 144.
29 W. Maisel, Trybunał Koronny w świetle laudów sejmikowych i konstytucji sejmowych, 
“Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne, 1982, XXXIV, vol. 2, pp. 91- 92, 101.
30 Z. Rymaszewski, op.cit.; also in: Sprawy gdańskie przed sądami zadwornymi oraz ingerenc-
ja królów w gdański wymiar sprawiedliwości XVI – XVIII w., Wrocław 1985, pp. 156–157.
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ed to an unknown compilation of royal judgments from the sixteenth 
century, which added to our knowledge of precedents. I. Dwornicka 
and W. Uruszczak, the authors of that valuable contribution, stated that 
“the question whether adjudications of courts, in particular the rulings 
of higher courts of Polish law, were a source of law in Poland of the 
past centuries is a problem that science still needs to resolve.”31 How-
ever, they claim elsewhere (in the conclusion) that “it would seem ap-
propriate […] to consider them [i.e. rulings of the royal courts – B.L.] 
one of the sources of law.”32 Such observations only confirm that the 
matter deserves to be examined. 
The Statute of Nieszawa of 1454 on 
Precedents. Its Reflection in the Compilations 
and Treatises of Historical Polish Jurists
A number of researchers (J.W. Bandtkie, A.Z. Helcel, R. Hube, 
P. Dąbkowski, I. Dwornicka and W. Uruszczak) drew attention to the 
provision on precedents included in the Statute of Nieszawa. This is 
the only statutory regulation (besides the inoperative provision in the 
Correction of Laws of 1532)33 which prescribes use of precedents as 
a source of law; therefore it deserves particular attention. 
In the complex structure of the Statute of Nieszawa34, the article 
pertaining to precedents appears twice: in the Greater Polish Nieszawa 
edition (I) of November 12th, 1454,35 and the standard version (II) con-
tained in the alleged charter of Kazimierz Jagiellończyk issued in 
31 I. Dwornicka, W. Uruszczak, Nieznany zbiór wyroków sądów królewskich (Decreta regia) 
z lat 1517 - 1550 w rękopisie Biblioteki Jagiellońskiej, “Czasopimo Prawno-Historyczne” 
1988, XL, vol. 2, p. 183.
32 Ibidem, p. 193.
33 Cf. p. 5 below, 
34 S. Roman, Przywileje nieszawskie, “SHPP” 1957, VII, vol. 2, Wrocław 1957, p. 213f.
35 Ibidem, p. 27–28. The entire text of that edition was published by B. Ulanowski, Na-
jdawniejszy układ systematyczny prawa polskiego z XV wieku, AKP vol. V, pp. 61–69.
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Nieszawa on November 23 145436, but which in fact was drafted in 1496 
as part of the confirmation of Jan Olbracht at the Sejm of Piotrków.37
Thus, according to our current knowledge on the charters of Niesza-
wa, the origins of the article on precedents should be sought in Greater 
Poland. R. Hube, having found it to be absent in the Lesser Polish editions, 
attributed it even to certain unique character traits of Greater Poles.38 
The content of the article is cited after the standard version (II) of 
149639, as this very redaction (the aforesaid first version differed little 
from the second)40 was incorporated into Łaski’s edition that Polish le-
gal writers relied on later, as well as reprinted in Volumina Legum.41 The 
article reads as follows: 
De libro iudiciorum
Item statuimus, quod pro iudiciis iuste expediendis et negotiis in iudicium 
deductis scribendis ideliter, fiat unus liber iudiciorum seu actorum in qua-
libet districtu. Et dum in aliqua causa in iudicium deducta super aliquo 
articulo causa in iudicium deducta super aliquo articulo audita proposi-
tione et responsione, fuerit in iudicio sentenciatum, quod ilia sententia in 
librum actorum inscribatur, ut postea super eodem articulo vel ei simili, 
similis sententia proferatur.
36 On that charter see remarks by S. Roman, op.cit., pp. 55–60; ibidem, the entire discussion 
concerning the so-called universal charter.
37 Ibidem, pp. 28 and 56–60.
38 R. Hube, Statuta nieszawskie z 1454 roku, Warszawa 1875, p. 48: “In any case, the pre-
dilection of Greater Poles for a formal, strictly determined order and the abhorrence of 
indeterminacy is most vividly manifested in the demand they have advanced and which 
they continually support, namely to adhere to written laws and to grant binding force to 
precedents.” V. also ibidem pp. 44, 46. 
39 J. Łaski, Commune incliti Poloniae regni privilegium, p. 93v. Łaski used the text of the 
original, cf. S. Roman, Przywileje nieszawskie, p. 28.
40 The only difference is that version I reads sit unus liber, whereas in version II this is fiat 
unus liber. However, sections De dissimili sententia cause equalis (I), De libro iudiciorum 
(II) are indeed distinct.
41 Volumina Legum, I, p. 115, f. 250. Hereinafter: VL. I quote Volumina following the Peters-
burg edition by Ohryzko, additionally providing pages of the Piarist edition.
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The text is lucid and does not arouse any particular doubt. Accord-
ing to the provision, each district should have one—one could say spe-
cial42—court ledger in which the ruling should have been entered after 
a case had been adjudicated, so that in an identical or similar case the 
same (literally: similar – similis) decision would be made. The article 
thus provides with respect to two issues: 1) the establishment of a led-
ger, 2) formulation of a judgment based on earlier rulings. The latter 
clearly seeks to recognize precedent as a basis for adjudication: in the 
same case (super eodem articulo) one should deliver a similar (which, 
considering the intention of the legislator, is likely to mean “the same”)43 
judgment. What is more, it goes even further as it provides for the use of 
ruling in similar cases (vel ei similii), aiming for admission of the prin-
ciple of analogy. 
The practical application of precedents, initially provided for only 
in the Greater Polish charter (I) was to take place—as followed from 
the article—already at district level, i.e. in land (ziemski) or municipal 
(grodzki) court. Thanks to the universal charter of 1496 (II) it came into 
effect nationally, meaning that the courts throughout Poland were 
to comply with the rule. This should be reflected in the sources relat-
ing to those courts, but no such evidence can be found.44 What is more, 
the injunction to establish a ledger in which rulings would be entered 
should also be manifested in the structure of court books after 1454. 
However, court books show no traces of a separate ledger for which 
the Statute of Nieszawa provided.45 One may therefore suspect that the 
42 Most likely, this is how the provision was understood by J. W. Bandtkie and P. Dąbkowski. 
43 Obviously, such an interpretation may give rise to objections: in the literal sense, similis 
sententia merely means similar rather than the same ruling. However, it was probably the 
intention of the legislator—evinced in the directive to record judgments separately—to 
have identical rulings in the same cases. At any rate, the principles of modern interpretation 
should not be applied to medieval texts. 
44 Cf. I. Bielecka, Inwentarze ksiąg archiwów grodzkich i ziemskich wielkopolskich XIV-XVIII 
wieku, Poznań 1965, pp. 9–10.
45 Ibidem, passim, does not observe any changes in the court books in the wake of the Stat-
ute of Nieszawa. Books such as Decreta began to function as separate ledgers in the 
courts of Greater Poland much later (e.g. as of 1592 in the land courts of Poznań. Ibidem, 
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1454 article concerning precedents remained a dead letter, were it not 
for the fact that it is very tangible in the later compilations of land law 
and works focusing on that law. 
The first to interpret the Nieszawa article was Jan Łaski, who in 
a note on the margin of the text wrote: Sententie inscribantur libris iudi-
ciorum, ut in futurum pari modo casus similes iudicentur.46 In a chrono-
logical sense, Łaski was closest to the provision; admittedly, it had been 
formulated in 1454 but it became universally applicable (throughout the 
Crown lands) only after 1496. His opinion is thus extremely valuable, 
not to mention that it is quite unequivocal: judgments are to be entered 
into court ledgers so that in the future similar cases may be judged in the 
same manner (pari modo).47
Relatively soon, a provision recognizing precedent as a source of 
law found its way into the grand project of the ultimately rejected Cor-
rection of Laws of 1532, but it stipulated that precedent applies only 
where there is no pertinent provision in the statutes, C. 2, in fine: Nisi 
casus novus in iudiciis emerserit, qui in statutis non esset expressus, 
talis enim aliorum statutorum et sententiarum authenticarum similitu-
dine [emphasis added] erit iudicandus.48 It may be conjectured that the 
regulation was inspired by the substance of the Nieszawa article49 but 
pp. 418, 422), and therefore in a manner unrelated to the Nieszawa article. Kraków ledgers 
of that type were created in 1525 (land courts) and 1562 (municipal courts), which again 
shows no association with the Statute of Nieszawa (on the introduction of separate ledgers. 
Cf. S. Kutrzeba, Katalog krajowego archiwum aktów grodzkich i ziemskich w Krakowie, 
with copies from: Teka grona konserwatorów z Galicji Zachodniej, vol. III, Kraków 1907, 
pp. 15, 35, 138. 
46 J. Łaski, op.cit.
47 Naturally, the expression pari modo is assumed to refer to identity in the material sense 
(identity of the ruling) as opposed to the identity of the lawsuit. If the latter had been meant, 
the citing of the judgment would not have sufficed. 
48 Correctura statutorum et consuetudinum Regni Poloniae…, ed. M. Bobrzyński, “Staro-
dawne Prawa Polskiego Pomniki”, Kraków 1874, p. 10. Cf. remarks by W. Uruszczak, Pró-
ba kodyfikacji prawa polskiego w pierwszej połowie XVI wieku, Warszawa 1979, pp. 220, 
222. also idem, W. Uruszczak, Korektura praw z 1592 roku. Studium historycznoprawne, 
vol. I, Warszawa–Kraków 1990, p. 62.
49 In his notes to C. 12 of the Correction, M. Bobrzyński does not mention Art. 15 of the 
Nieszawa charter as a source.
200 | Bogdan Lesiński
the limitation of scope to casus novi set it apart from the latter, which did 
not contain such a stipulation. 
Jakub Przyłuski cited the text after Łaski, and remarked on the note 
which Łaski added on the margin. As for the Nieszawa article, he focused 
solely on the second directive, omitting the fragment concerning the es-
tablishment of a ledger of rulings in each district.50 More importantly, 
however, Przyłuski provided the section containing the Nieszawa article 
with a brief yet significant commentary: Uno iure, unis etiam consuetu-
dinibus ac similibus praeiudicatis [emphasis added] omnes terrae totius 
Regni iudicentur.51 Thus Przyłuski mentions three principal sources of 
law: statutes52, custom, and precedent (in similar cases). The description 
could not have been at odds with the realities at the time, because one 
can hardly imagine such an experienced jurist as Przyłuski—who envi-
sioned his work to be a compilation that would become binding53—con-
fabulated and falsely asserted the fundamental principles of the validity 
of law. 
Jan Sierakowski, Przyłuski’s contemporary, states in his Układ 
(Art. 7) that: Novus casus non expressus in statutis regni similitudine 
aliarum sententiarum autenticarum in simili promulgatorum iudicandus 
est. Casim. in Niesh.54 Sierakowski thus ascribed the Nieszawa article 
a sense it clearly had not had (limitation of precedents to casus novi), al-
though it coincided with the aforementioned provision in the unenacted 
Correction of Law and—perhaps—with the customary law at the time. 
We do not learn anything special from the work by J. Herburt. 
In the Latin abecedary, the excerpt from the Nieszawa article (from 
Et dum — —) was included in the entry for Decretum, under the title 
50 J. Przyłuski, Leges seu statuta ac privilegia Regni Poloniae omnia, Kraków 1553, p. 589.
51 Ibidem, p. 588.
52 Przyłuski understood ius to mean leges, constitutiones, just as S. Sarnicki, cf. note 57.
53 C. H. Grajewski, op.cit., pp. 117–118.
54 Jana Sierakowskiego Układ systematyczny prawa polskiego z r. 1554, ed. B. Ulanowski, 
AKP, p. 105, Art. 7 Sierakowski refers once again to the Nieszawa article in Art. 94 p. 114: 
Sententiae per iudicem latae debent in librum actorum inscribí, ut postea in simili articulo 
similis sententia proferatur.
Precedents as a Source of Land Law… | 201 
Similia simili decreto decernentur.55 J. Łączyński did not mention the 
Nieszawa article at all, yet he observed that when grounds for judgment 
are lacking in the written Crown law, one should adjudge: — — pursu-
ant to the custom that is in concord with justice, which from the decrees 
of the first kings should be taken.56 The works of Stanisław Sarnicki and 
Tomasz Drezner offer more in this respect. 
Sarnicki quotes the Nieszawa article in Polish: “An when in such 
a case that is brought before the court the matter is judged there having 
heard the complaint and the response, that sentence shall be entered into 
a book of records, so that later such a matter or one that is similar may 
receive a similar judgment.”57 However, what Sarnicki observes else-
where is the most important. Further on in his work, the author returns 
to the Nieszawa article in the section entitled Decreta in simili sequi 
iudices debent, writing that: Casimiri statutum in Nieszowa mandat de-
creta, quae feruntur, in unum librum conscribere, ut postea in simili 
super eodem articulo decernantur. Verum enim vero consentire debet. 
He then offers the following piece of advice: The wise judge needs to 
be indulged so that through him all is duly satisfied: the law58, consue-
tudinibus, decretis in simiłi. Yet the sacred justice should be satisfied 
first and foremost.59 Sarnicki thus recommends that judges treat statutes, 
custom and precedent equally, but emphasized that—as a fundamental 
element of judgment—justice (aequitas) takes first place.60 To Sarnicki, 
precedents (decreta in simili) are therefore one of the essential sources 
55 J. Herburt, Statuta Regni Poloniae in ordinem alphabeti digesta, Kraków 1503, p. 72.
56 Z. Kolankowski, Zapomniany prawnik XVI wieku – Jan Łączyński i jego “Kompendium 
sądów Króla Jegomości”, Toruń 1960, p. 103.
57 S. Sarnicki, Statuta i metryka przywilejów koronnych, Kraków 1594, p. 790. Further on, on 
p. 974, Sarnicki adds: There should be separate books to enter the judicial sentence—in-
voking the Nieszawa article. Sarnicki was therefore of the opinion that the Nieszawa article 
provided for special ledgers to record judgments, as already noted above. 
58 For Sarnicki this meant leges, constitutiones.
59 Ibidem, p. 1293.
60 Sarnicki was very sensitive about adherence to the principle of justice (or equity, one might 
guess) and often returned to the issue in his work: pp. 783–789. Aequitas. As the judges 
rule, they should first take heed of justice. Cf. also p. 1287 where he criticizes the fact that 
judges pay more attention to the letter of the law than to justice, pp. 1291, 1292.
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of law, just as they were for Przyłuski. What is more, by offering judges 
advice, he situates them in the domain of practice, as something that 
is actually employed. 
Drezner approaches the issue in a similar way in his Institutiones, 
stating that one of the sources of law in Poland—other than constitutio-
nes—was the judges’ consistency (constantia) of adjudication in judicial 
matters. This used to be called “similar rulings” which were subsequently 
applied in similar cases.61 In another one of his works, Drezner also states 
that precedents (decreta in similibus causis) were considered law, mean-
ing that in the same cases their legal force was on a par with statutes.62
The awareness of the applicability of precedents survived among le-
gal writers until the end of the Commonwealth. Andrzej Lisiecki, author 
of a 1638 work on the Crown Tribunal, referred to the knowledge and 
use of law among its deputies, stating: And where there are praeiudi-
cata, those must not be ignored, for this law clearly provides — — (here 
Lisiecki cites the Nieszawa article).63 Stanisław Ochocki, a seventeenth-
century jurist whom our scholarly literature unfairly fails to appreci-
ate64, wrote that similia simili decreto seu preaiudicato decernantur.65 In 
the eighteenth century, Michał Słoński asserted the same, invoking the 
Nieszawa article66, and adding elsewhere that under that statute a special 
61 T. Drezner, Institutiones…, pp. 10–11: Sunt etiam nonnulli iuris constituendi modi apud 
Polonos, nempe magistratus qui iurisdictioni praesunt, constantia de rebus iudicata; quae 
similia decreta appellantur et ad similes postea causas trahuntur. Cf. K. Bukowska, op.cit., 
pp. 103–104.
62 T. Drezner, Processus iudiciarius Regni Poloniae, in: Proces sądowny ziemskiego prawa 
koronnego, ed. G. Czaradzki, Warszawa 1640, p. D2: De re iudicata: Appendix. Decreta 
in similibus caussis alegata pro legibus habentur, ubi est rerum iudicatarum constantia. 
Drezner also mentions precedents in Similium iuris Poloni cum iure Romano centuria una, 
Paris 1602, p. 39, erroneously ascribing the Nieszawa article to Kazimierz Wielki, which 
was not corrected by K. Bukowska, op.cit.
63 A. Lisiecki, Trybunał Główny Koronny siedmią splendorów oświecony, Kraków 1638. 
Cf. J. Makarewicz, Polskie prawo karne, Lvov—Warszawa 1910, p. 13.
64 S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł…, vol. I, p. 281; Kutrzeba assumed Łochowski to have been an 
eighteenth-century author, and found the latter’s Regulae iuris to be a work of minor value. 
65 S. Łochowski, Regulae iuris et loci communes forenses…, Kraków 1644, p. 110.
66 M. Słoński, Accessoria, statut i konstytucje, Lvov 1765, p. 38.
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ledger should exist in which rulings could be recorded.67 In his renowned 
treaty, Teodor Ostrowski complained of the absence of a book of Polish 
laws (a civil law of the crown provinces thus far separately enacted we 
do not possess — —), and noted that — — its knowledge [i.e. of the 
law – B.L.] must be gained by great labour from massive volumes, and 
even from precedents [emphasis added] and customs.”68 A little further 
on, describing the shortcomings of the then civil law (the law applied 
at courts, in other words), the author observed as follows: “in the afore-
said and in similar deficiencies of our law the statute of 1454 provides 
that one should be guided by praeiudicatis vel similibus decretis. In our 
country, they constitute the law of custom whose authority was sacred 
in all civil societies.”69
The works and the compendia written by historical Polish jurists 
do not yield much information about precedents. This is not surpris-
ing, because early Polish jurisprudence of land law was exceedingly 
meagre and suffered from lack of reflection on almost every issue. With 
few exceptions, this was a pursuit resembling collectorship (compendia-
rism) rather than science. Even so, one does obtain some information. 
Almost all of the jurists cited here (Łaski, Przyłuski, Sierakowski, Her-
burt, Sarnicki, Drezner, Lisiecki, Łochowski, Słoński, Ostrowski) either 
referred to the Nieszawa article or relied on it, subscribing to the view 
that in land law the principle of precedent could be applied when mak-
ing a judgment, in other words that a previous ruling offered grounds for 
another judicial decision in an identical or similar case. Even codifiers 
(Correction of Laws) adopted a similar approach. 
Some authors went as far as to state that precedents were a funda-
mental source (besides custom and statutes) of land law (Przyłuski, Sar-
nicki, Drezner, and to some extent Ostrowski). It was also stressed that 
precedents are to be created for casus novi, thus rectifying legal gaps 
67 Ibidem p. 73.
68 T. Ostrowski, Prawo cywilne narodu polskiego, 2nd edition, vol. I, Warszawa 1787, pp. 8–9.
69 Ibidem, p. 13.
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(for which the Nieszawa article did not provide). Such a view was ex-
pressed by the codifiers of 1532, Sierakowski, as well as Ostrowski. 
Few authors (Łączyński, Ostrowski) classified precedents among the 
sources of customary law, an opinion which might seem debatable to-
day70, but which does not bear significantly on these deliberations. Most 
importantly, however, the writings of past jurists decidedly corroborate 
the existence and application of precedents in Polish land law. They also 
attest to the operation of precedents in yet another way, which will be 
discussed later on (see V, VIII below).
Precedents in Constitutiones et 
Iura Terrae Lanciciensis
According to the Nieszawa article, special books for judicial rulings 
were to be kept in each district. Thus in the mid-fifteenth century it was 
presumed that even the judgments of the lowest-level nobles’ courts 
could become precedents that would be applicable later. Still, court 
books show no evidence of such practice. At any rate, there are no men-
tions of such a mode of adjudication, where the judge invoked an earlier 
ruling in a similar case.71 It was not uncommon that the bench did not 
know how to resolve a case and resorted to ad interrogandum (i.e. so-
licited a solution with higher-ranking land officials) yet no information 
can be found that they ever fell back on a previously passed judgment. 
If so, were there any grounds for the Nieszawa article and was it asso-
ciated with an existing (or perhaps only postulated) practice, whereby 
a verdict could become a law? 
70 It is much the same problem as the question of whether English common law should be 
considered customary law, which one could hardly agree with given that law deriving from 
precedents developed in an altogether different way than customary or enacted law. On 
that subject cf. M. Sczaniecki, Powszechna historia państwa i prawa, Warszawa 1973, 
pp. 217–218.
71 This applies to court records prior to 1454 and later ones. V. the selection of records by 
Helcel tittled Starodawne Prawa Polskiego Pomniki and the collection of records in AGZ.
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Although court books cannot corroborate the practice, the question 
should be answered in the affirmative, meaning that land (or municipal) 
courts did shape law through their decisions even prior to the Niesza-
wa charter. Here, one cannot rely on the so-called precedents in the stat-
utes of Kazimierz Wielki, as all indications seem to suggest that they 
had nothing to do with actual rulings and represent fabricated cases.72 
However, the significance of precedents is validated by the provisions of 
Constitutiones et tura terrae Lanciciensis, a compilation from the first 
half of the fifteenth century.73
Already R. Hube, in a paper delivered at Biblioteka Warszawska 
(1853, I), found that Constitutiones consist largely of precedents.74 The 
matter was investigated in greater detail by S. Kutrzeba. Nevertheless, 
his disquisitions on the subject lack clarity at times and do contain oc-
casional errors. At one point, Kutrzeba stated that Constitutiones con-
tain four precedents, namely Art. 18, 23, 29, and 3075, whereas later he 
argues that there are only three: Art. 18, 23, 3976. In fact, five articles in 
that compilation are based on judicial rulings77, which for the purposes 
of this text will be designated with numbers according to the edition of 
the manuscript Ptrb. III published by R. Ulanowski78. The number-
ing of respective articles is as follows: 16(18), 21(23), 27(29), 28(30), 
72 Cf. p. 2. Admittedly, some researchers believed that precedents in the statutes originat-
ed from judicial practice, but they were unable to prove it reliably. Sufficient arguments 
against judicial provenance of the precedents in the statutes were advanced by A. Win-
iarz, Prejudykaty w Statutach Kazimierza Wielkiego, “Kwartalnik Historyczny” 1895, IX, 
pp. 195–206; S. Roman, Geneza statutów…, pp. 98–107.
73 S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł…, vol. I, op. Cit., pp. 102–103, 268–270.
74 R. Hube, Przyczynek…, op.cit., p. 277. Hube also states there that the later (1505) Consue-
tudines terrae Cracoviensis were based on precedents, but there is no evidence to support 
this, cf. S. Roman, Geneza statutów…, p. 100115.
75 S. Kutrzeba, Introduction to Cautelae…, p. 200.
76 S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł, vol. I, pp. 268–269.
77 Five precedents were also identified by S. Roman, Geneza statutów, p.100, notes 114 and 
115.
78 AKP IV, p. 435 - 492 (in the notes, Ulanowski provided modified versions of the text ac-
cording to Sier. IV). The volume also includes the compilation of Łęczyca from another 
manuscript (Jag. II) where the articles are designated with different numbers (pp. 619–628).
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41(42).79 As it appears, Kutrzeba was closer to the truth in the first, ear-
lier assertion, than in what he stated later, where in addition article (39) 
was erroneously classified as a precedent. 
A more detailed analysis of the above five articles may shed some 
light on how precedents were formulated and employed.
Art. 16(18): Domina — — Drogochna de Birzwyenna nomine sui 
kmethonis acquisiva in Iacussio de Slupcza pro medietate genitalium 
quinque marcas, sicut pro medio homine.80 By repeating the ruling of the 
court, the article demonstrates convincingly that an adjudication had set 
a precedent which was subsequently adopted in a compilation of custom-
ary law. It must have been included there because it was in effect in prac-
tice, while the compilation was to ensure that it remained in force in the 
future. Let us add that in Art. 16 (and very likely in the articles quoted 
below) there are no fictitious elements: the parties to the action actually 
lived and were involved in a suit towards the end of the sixteenth century 
(which means that the verdict was delivered at that time), therefore the 
judicial ruling originates from a proceeding which did in fact take place.81 
Perhaps the precedent gave rise to doubt or required subjective and 
objective extension, because the following article, 17 (19), essentially 
a continuation of the previous one, states that 
Statutum est igitur per omnes dominos in colloquio generali, quan-
do aliquis alteri abscidit testiculos, alias mąda, sicut pro capite iudica-
mus, seu ipsa genitalia extrahet qualiscunque violenter, solvat cum pena 
septuaginta et actori quinquaginta.82
79 Given that Kutrzeba referred to the articles of the Łęczyca compilation following the num-
bering in J. W. Bandtkie, Ius Polonicum, Warszawa 1831, pp. 194–200, the convention he 
used is provided here in parentheses. S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł…, I, p. 270, reports that 
Bandtkie relied on the text in the manuscript Sier. IV, but the numbering deviates from 
the published version of Sier. IV. Cf. AKP II, p. XXXVII and AKP IV, pp. 433–452. and the 
synoptic table by A. Kłodziński, Tab. VIII. Cf. also AKP II, p. LXXI. How then did Bandt-
kie arrive at such a different numbering?
80 AKP, IV, p. 438.
81 As demonstrated by S. Kutrzeba, who studied the court books of Łęczyca published by 
A. Pawiński.
82 AKP, IV, p. 438.
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Thus the dignitaries at the colloquium (or in a court of that nature) 
confirmed the precedent of “Drogochna vs Jakusz” but was that the 
point? The ruling of the precedent (i.e. that the removal of the genitals 
of a peasant entails a fine in the amount of wergeld) was clearly made 
more general, because without doubt the resolution of the dignitaries 
pertained to the nobility, and furthermore provided for additional public 
(spetuaginta) and private (actori quinquaginta) penalties in the event of 
a violent or rather intentional (violenter!) criminal act. Hence the collo-
quial decision—which might be conjectured in view of the two articles 
being connected—does not mean that precedents had to be endorsed by 
land authority; it only proves that in a specific case judicial precedent 
inspired a norm with a wider scope of application. 
2) Art. 21(23): Citavit Malsky fratres pro porcione hereditatis post 
mortem fratris ipsorum in Lythwania sine prole mortui, quem evaserunt 
prescripcione unius anni et sex septimanis, ideo pro bonis derelictis pus-
czina servatur prescripcio unius anni cum sex septimanis; et hoc intel-
ligas de illis hominibus, qui simul trahunt in una terra.83 Here, one first 
quoted the ruling in the case of the Malksi brothers concerning the pre-
scription of claims to succession after persons who died without issue, 
which certainly functioned as a precedent (otherwise it would not have 
been taken into consideration); subsequently, a general rule was derived 
which for editorial reasons of was better suited to a compilation of laws. 
3) Art. 27(29): beginning with: De prescripcione nota, Slavantha con-
questus est contra Raphaelem de B. — — , and ending with: diiudicatum 
exstitit: ex quo litteras non habuit super caucione fideiussoria, ob pre-
scripcionem annorum trium causam huiusmodi amisisse.84 Here, only the 
content of the ruling in a particular dispute is provided; having been includ-
ed in the compilation it became one of its provisions (namely: an undoc-
umented guaranty for a woman receiving dowry that she would not make 
any claims against the family estate was effective only for three years). 
83 Ibidem, p. 439.
84 Ibidem, p. 441.
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4) Art. 28(30) Statutum est, quod omnis spoliatus de quacunque 
re sive hereditaria sive alia quacunqua ipse spoliatus fuerit, in pos-
sessionem idem spoliatus debet restitui vel tenetur ad possessionem 
ante omnia, et postea agat, qui vult, contra ipsum possessorem. This 
apparently statutory provision (statutum est) pertaining to restoration of 
ownership had in fact been based on a precedent: Et hoc contingit Doro-
thee relicte de R. contra suam socram Stachnam — — (followed by the 
description of the case).85 
5) Art. 41(42) is structured similarly to Art. 28: first, the provision 
is stated using abstract wording, only to observe that such had been the 
verdict in a particular lawsuit: Quando frater germanus sorori vendit 
hereditatem, et postea alter frater conclenodialis illam hereditatem vel-
let aquirere, dicendo: ego sum proximor quam soror habens maritum de 
clenodio alio, iudicatum exstitit, quod talis sorror est proximior; et hoc 
fuit inter Katherinam Hunslay et Otham de D., et multi domini iudi-
caverunt causam istam. The latter passage (multi domini) seems to un-
derscore that it was no ordinary ruling in a suit where proximity to estate 
was argued, but a judgment of more momentous significance.86
The unknown author (or perhaps authors) of the compilation entitled 
Constitutiones et iura terrae Lanciciensis took a twofold advantage of 
judicial rulings: either they incorporated the content of the ruling in the 
compilation, thus making it a binding regulation (Art. 16, 27) or drew on 
the judgment but used it to formulate a general principle, a provision of 
abstract nature (Art. 21, 28, 41).87
The above articles of the compilation of Łęczyca are proof that cer-
tain decisions of the courts were particularly well remembered. Those 
may have been judgments which created something new, a novel ius. 
They were remembered (and most likely recorded in writing) while stat-
ing the parties involved and providing description of the case, as verdicts 
85 Ibidem.
86 Ibidem, p. 444.
87 Cf. S. Roman, Geneza statutów…, p. 100, notes 114, 115.
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that were to be relied on in judicial practice and as rulings which be-
came the basis for more refined legal provisions befitting a compilation. 
Consequently, judgments of land courts had law-making signifi-
cance even before the Nieszawa article was issued. The latter only con-
firmed the existing state of affairs and sought to safeguard it by statutory 
means. Still, the judgments of the various local land and municipals 
courts did not become precedents that had a major impact on the shape 
of law. Royal courts (during the sejm or in curia) as well as the later 
Crown Tribunal played a much greater role in this respect. 
The Creation of Precedents in the Royal 
Courts In Curia and In Conventu
When M. Bobrzyński published the judgments of the royal court and de-
manded that conclusive judicial rulings be delivered, he primarily meant 
those “which possessed the authority of precedents for all other courts, 
that is judgments of the royal court delivered in curia or at the Sejm, 
as well as the judgments of the tribunal.”88 Bobrzyński had therefore 
no hesitation in attributing the power of precedent to the rulings of the 
royal courts and the Tribunal. P. Dąbkowski did likewise later on, stat-
ing that the decisions of the royal Sejm courts in the first place gained 
the authority of precedent.89 Similarly, S. Kutrzeba argued that the ver-
dicts of royal courts, in particular its Sejm sessions, had the power of 
precedent.90
The above authors were thoroughly conversant with the sourc-
es of Polish law, while two jurists worked on precedents directly: 
M. Bobrzyński edited and published a compilation of royal judgments, 
88 M. Bobrzyński, Introduction to Decreta…, op.cit., p. 11.
89 P. Dąbkowski, Prawo prywatne…., I, op.cit., p. 44.
90 S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł…, I, op.cit., p. 157 “Among judgments those of the royal 
courts were the most important, the superior of which were those pronounced at the Sejm, 
given that the king was a source of law. Hence such rulings had the nature of precedents.”
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which he provided with an entry for ‘praeiudicata’ in the index91, 
whereas S. Kutrzeba studied legal norms which had their origins in the 
judicial rulings contained in Constitutiones (Lancicienses) and Cau-
telae.92 However, both writers—not to mention Dąbkowski—failed to 
provide any conclusive source evidence to support their assertions. Only 
S. Kutrzeba founded his reasoning on the premise that royal judgments 
had the power of precedents because the king was a source of law.93 
The authors thus formulated their observations based on the general im-
pression gained from the knowledge of sources rather than on specific 
evidence. 
On the other hand, finding incontrovertible proof that judgments de-
livered by the royal courts had the power of precedents is extremely 
difficult. We do not know any provision which would affirm the prec-
edential force and significance of the royal court rulings. It is possible 
than no such provision had ever existed, which means that the matter is 
likely to have been governed by custom. In a project of judicial proce-
dure from 1611, J. Swoszowski concluded that the jurisdiction of royal 
courts was based primarily on custom, examples and the authority of 
the rulings.94 The “examples” and “authority of the decrees” are prob-
ably the elements we are looking for, since they relate to precedents. 
However, these are only conjectures, therefore other sources have to be 
drawn upon. 
A certain amount of material—which is decisive in my opinion—
may be found in Decreta, published by Bobrzyński, and the aforemen-
tioned index with which they are supplied. Several acts contained in the 
volume were also determined by B. Grużewski to have been sources 
attesting to the creation of precedents.95 For various reasons, the infor-
91 M. Bobrzyński, Decreta…., op.cit., p. 460.
92 S. Kutrzeba, Cautelae…., op.cit., pp. 200, 207–209.
93 Cf. footnote 89 above.
94 VL III, p. 35, f. 67: The first jurisdiction of ours is the royal one at the sejm or in curia. 
3. Great though it is and governed by various statutes and constitutions, its judgments take 
greater heed of the custom, the example and the authority of the decrees.
95 B. Grużewski, Sądownictwo…, op.cit., p. 788.
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mation cited by both authors cannot be accepted without reservations96, 
but it offers valuable hints nonetheless. It would therefore be worth-
while to examine the volume edited by Bobrzyński from this standpoint. 
There was a practice in the royal courts that the monarch suspended 
the proceedings in the assessorial court or referred it from that court to the 
Sejm court where, aided by advisors, he would arrive at a decision of 
a broader significance, because it would have the force of statute in the 
future. 
(D. 81 – 1515 – p. 83) – J. I. sues J. B, as according to the plaintiff the 
latter unfairly brought action against the former before the ecclesiastical 
court alleging usury. The king with his assessors (consiliarii), probably 
unable to settle the case straight away, suspends it — — ad conventio-
nem generalem proximam — —. Et quicquid Maiestas regia cum consil-
iariis in eadem conventione laudaverit seu adinvenerit in eadem causa, 
hoc pro statuto [emphasis added] perpetuo firmiter tenere debent. If the 
two final words referred only to the parties to the action (as is argued by 
B. Grużewski, who in a sense deprives the decision of a more general 
import)97, then one can hardly understand why efforts were made to es-
tablish a norm with the virtue of perpetual statute solely for the benefit 
of the parties. The intention therefore was to formulate a provision which 
in the future would be binding for others as well. 
(D. 244 — 1523 — p. 227) — J. B. accuses K. G., land clerk of 
Chełm, that the latter made an erroneous entry concerning the adjourn-
ment of a court-decreed period, as a result of which J.B. incurred losses. 
J. B. solicits mainly—it would seem—a restitutio in integrum. Et sacra 
Maiestas regia, volens ne quisquam circa iudicia in suis causis opprim-
eretur et etiam cupiens, ut quilibet suam causam custodiret, et attendens 
hoc negotium non fore parvi momenti, volensque desuper statutum con-
dere [emphasis added] qualiter postea tales actiones et negotia iudicari 
96 B. Grużewski took only one of the precedents in the index into account, but at the same time 
cited another two which Bobrzyński did not include in the index. D. 244
97 B. Grużewski, op.cit.
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et conservari in toto regno habebunt, hanc causam ad conventionem 
generalem — — remisit — — (and appointed a date of hearing for the 
parties). There can be no doubt here that the king anticipated, through 
the issuance of the proper ruling in the Sejm court, the establishment of 
a universally binding norm (in land law) in the future. 
The referral of ongoing proceedings from curia to conventio, as it 
was briefly and somewhat inaccurately recorded in those acts, did not of 
course mean that the cases were debated at the Sejm but that they were 
heard by the Sejm court.98 After all, the king resolved the matter cum 
consiliaris (with the senators) as opposed to cum conventu. In any case 
the question was elucidated sufficiently by B. Grużewski.99 
The decisive factor for the resolution of a dispute and the substance 
of the judgment—both in the courts in curia and in conventu—was 
the person of the king (at least during the reign of Zygmunt Stary).100 
Still, why did the king not content himself with delivering a fitting judg-
ment in the assessorial court (in curia)? One can justifiably presume, as 
B. Grużewski did, that the cases referred to the Sejm court were chiefly 
new ones (casus novi) which thus far had not been regulated by law.101 
In such circumstances, law-making (statutum condere) through judicial 
ruling was safer for the king in view of the authority of the Sejm court 
and less blatant when viewed from the standpoint of the nihil novi prin-
ciple. A later constitution (from 1607) quite clearly affirmed the exclu-
sive competence of the Sejm court with respect to casus novi, stating 
that nova emergentia shall however be decided at the Sejm.102 
98 In this case, the phrase ad conventionem meant “for the duration of the Sejm” on that sub-
ject cf. W. Uruszczak, Sejm walny koronny w latach 1506–1540, 1981 “SHPP” XVI, p. 141.
99 B. Grużewski, op.cit., p. 798.
100 Ibidem, pp. 78–79. Regarding the decline of the position of the monarch in the Sejm court 
during the reign of subsequent kings cf. remarks by Bobrzyński in the Introduction to De-
creta, p. 141.
101 B. Grużewski, op.cit., pp. 77–78.
102 VL II, p. 439, f. 1609. Cf. Z. Szcząska, Sąd sejmowy w Polsce od końca XVI do końca XVIII 
wieku, “Czasopismo Prawo-Historyczne” 1968, XX, fasc. II, p. 104 and W. Uruszczak, 
Sejm walny…, p. 142.
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The information which the above sources provide concerns only 
the king’s intention to establish a new law by way of a judicial ruling. 
We do not learn anything about the content of the expected precedents 
though we do have an idea of what that content pertained to in general. 
However, Decreta also offer sources from which one finds out about 
precedents already created. 
Occasionally, the king created precedents concomitantly, as it were, 
to an ongoing proceeding. 
(D. 385 — 1527 — p. 348) —acting as an appellate instance, the 
king confirmed the judgment of the assessorial court in curia and 
— — preterea — — dignata est [i.e. Maiestas – B.L.] decemere: si et 
in quantum pars aliqua appellationem suam coram Maiestate sua infra 
spatium trium dierum attentare noluerit seu tardaverit, iam ipsa senten-
tia, a qua appellaverit, transit in rem iudicatam. Admittedly, the excerpt 
does not state that the king established a new law, but there is no doubt103 
that a new precedent-like norm emerged, at least in the sense that it was 
incorporated into the royal adjudication. The norm imposed a limita-
tion of three days for appeals from the judgment of the assessorial court 
(in curia) to the king. 
At times, precedent developed in a manner of ordinance: it was not 
associated with a particular case but rather with an issue which recurred 
repeatedly in numerous cases. Consequently, the court, acting upon spe-
cial instruction from the king (ex informatione et interrogatione sacrae 
Maiestatis regiae), who had been solicited for advice, formulated a suit-
able decision in the nature of a precedent. 
 (D. — 1527 — p. 340) – The act, relating to enforcement of court 
rulings, does not mention the names of the parties to litigation, never-
theless — — iudicium regium assesorium ad informationem Maiestatis 
regiae decrevit — —, it states when the earlier provisions on enforce-
ment should be applied and when the new ones (most likely specified in 
Formula processus of 1523) should take effect. 
103 Both Bobrzyński and Grużewski failed to take note of that ruling.
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Naturally, the creation of a precedent was most often associated with 
the substance of an individual, particular case heard before the royal 
court. 
(D. 458 — 1530 — p. 407) – Andrzej Lipski accused Jan of 
Ocieszyn, land clerk of Kraków, that the latter refused to issue a copy 
of the document relating to the division of an estate without a special, 
additional fee. The clerk responded that certain irregular entries into 
the registers were involved, i.e. other than provided for in the applicable 
formularies (most likely in Formula processus). (Maiestas) — — decer-
nere dignata est, prout praesentibus decernit, quod quicumque [empha-
sis added] voluerit alio modo et forma inscriptiones facere, vel inductio-
nes earundem tam in acta regalia quam etiam terrestria Cracoviensia 
a notario inscribi et induci optare preter eum modum et formam, quae 
in statuto est descripta, extunc — — quantitas salarii percipiendi in ar-
bitrio ipsius notarii dependebit, vel prout tales personae cum dicto no-
tario condictamen facere potuerint. Here, we find a precedent (to which 
quincumque attests)104, which is to apply in identical cases in the future. 
(D. 470 — 1530 — p. 415) — In a contention between brothers 
Paweł and Mikołaj K., and Adam Cz., the question of whether a court-
decreed deadline was correctly adjourned proved crucial for the dispute. 
The king decided that — — suspensio et prorogatio termini per suam 
Maiestatem absque consensu partium nulla est, nec fieri potuit — —. 
The ruling does not bear any distinct traits of a precedent, yet it is for-
mulated in such general terms that it most likely functioned as one.105
(D. 478 — 1530 — p. 419) — Jan of Ocieszyn, land clerk of 
Kraków, sues Stanisław L. for alleging unjustly that the clerk entered 
into the register a non-existent pledge on the estate of Stanisław L. to 
104 A precedent with identical content is quoted by T. Zawacki, Processus iudiciarius Regni 
Poloniae, Kraków 1619, p. 3. It was nevertheless established in 1539 at the Sejm court in 
Piotrków.
105 M. Bobrzyński in the index to Decreta defines the quoted act as a precedent, but for a differ-
ent reason: it allegedly contained a clause stating that the ruling should be applied in similar 
cases. On that issue cf. further in this text. 
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the benefit of A.L. Having proved falsehood of the allegation, the clerk 
turned to the king: — — ut sua Maiestas contra ipsum S. L. extenderet 
statutum regni de inordinatis citationibus editum et ut ipsum iuxta hoc 
idem statutum punire dignaretur — —. The king’s adjudication was di-
rected not only against the defendant: — — preterea sua Maiestas ei-
dem S. L. et omnibus aliis severiter mandare dignata est, ne amplius 
quispiam post hoc in futurum [emphases added] audeat officiales suae 
Maiestatis terrestres talibus inordinatibus querimoniis lacessere, et si 
aliquis in contrarium huic decreto et mandato suae Maiestatis fecerit, 
iuxta dispositionem statuti de inordinatis citationibus per suam Maies-
tatem irremissibiliter punietur.
One could argue that the king did not create a precedent in this case, 
but merely substantiated his ruling by citing a statutory provision (most 
likely the Statute of Nowy Korczyn from 1465, which concerned persons 
who levelled false accusations).106 That, however, would be an oversim-
plified explanation. The very fact of recognizing the binding force of 
the statute was precedential, for instance because one might have been 
unaware that the statute was still in effect or, even more importantly, 
whether the protection it provided for also applied to situations in which 
unfounded complaints were made against officials (after all, the clerk 
requested that the scope of the statute be extended to include the afore-
mentioned cases as well). At any rate, the ruling of the king was not only 
a judgment but also formulated a general norm that was to apply in the 
future. 
It follows from certain acts contained in Bobrzyński’s publication 
that the adjudication of a case involved the practice of invoking previous 
rulings, which thus operated as precedents. 
(D. 370 — 1527— p. 336) — At an appellate hearing: Iudicium 
itaque regium assessorium ex interrogatione ac informatione Maiesta-
tis regiae — — praesertim eo attento, quia pars citata [here: the party 
bringing the appeal] se defendebat contra actores praescriptione ter-
106 VL I, p. 72, f. 1158: De falsariis citationum puniendis.
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restri, atque etiam inhaerendo decreto Maiestatis regiae [emphasis add-
ed] in conventione Pyotrkoviensi inter nobiles — — lato ac facto — — 
(rules that the appellants shall continue to hold the estate against which 
their adversaries made claims by virtue of the right of proximity). 
Grużewski and Bobrzyński (in the index) note other information 
of that kind. Grużewski107 mentions an act (D. 323 — 1523 — p. 293) 
which contains the following decision — — aliae autem controversiae 
huis similes, ut — — [relevant judicial disputes are enumerated here] 
— — iuxta nostrae Maiestatis informationem in causa superiore fien-
dam sic pariformiter conservabunt et sic eidem conformabuntur. In turn, 
Bobrzyński counts it as a precedent that someone (D. 470 — 1530 — 
p. 415) quotes a similar dispute (— — parte actorea paratam controver-
siam ex actis — — in simili causa factam reproducente — —). However, 
in both instances the causae similes were limited to the circle of persons 
associated with litigation, or even those involved in it (in the latter case, 
the party invokes a dispute in which the plaintiffs were the same, the 
substance of the case was identical and only the defendant was different, 
probably an accomplice in the committed crime). Consequently, a ruling 
neither acquired the power of precedent (in the first case), nor did one 
invoke a ruling which already had the power of precedent (the second 
case). After all, judgments which function as precedents are expected 
to apply not only to all entities engaged in the same disputes, but they 
should be binding in cases where the subjects involved are altogether 
different. It would therefore be difficult to recognize the above as in-
stances of precedents. 
Leaving Bobrzyński’s publication aside, one can observe that other, 
albeit regrettably rare sources, corroborate the practice of quoting previ-
ous royal judgments. One such example is provided by H. Grajewski, 
who reports that in a lawsuit taking place in 1585 (Jakub Niemojewski 
vs Krzysztof Zborowski) invoked a very well-known ruling of 1537—
more on which below—that pertained to inordinata citatio. It may be 
107 B. Grużewski, op.cit., p. 783.
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noted that we owe our knowledge of the ruling to J. Przyłuski.108 Anoth-
er example of invoking precedent—this time in the domain of municipal 
law—is supplied by Z. Rymaszewski.109
The above source material from the volume published by 
M. Bobrzyński to some degree contributes to understanding the mecha-
nism behind the emergence of precedents. First and foremost, they show 
that the monarch and the Sejm court (alternatively the court in curia) 
endowed a ruling with a distinctly precedential character by virtue of 
asserting that they aim to make law (statutum condere) or by providing 
it with a clause that in the future it would apply to everyone who acts 
contrary to its provision. This was in fact a deliberate legislative ac-
tivity, with the exception that it was pursued by the Sejm court. Ulti-
mately, it gave rise to decreta regia in vim statuti, as they were called in 
the sixteenth century.110
As it follows from the cited sources, they would apply to cases 
as yet unresolved by law or to doubtful ones; to put in the most gen-
eral terms, they pertained to casus novi (which arose chiefly in the 
course of lawsuits). In any case, one can hardly imagine the creation of 
a precedent without the element of novelty; therefore, an adjudication 
of the royal court which did not possess that component would prob-
ably have not qualified as a precedent. Novelties were remembered 
and recorded,111 to be taken advantage of in other cases, i.e. by citing 
a ruling delivered earlier, a measure to which Bobrzyński’s publication 
explicitly refers. 
108 H. Grajewski, op.cit., p. 14017.
109 Z. Rymaszewski, Sprawy gdańskie…, pp. 156–157.
110 Cf. below.
111 A later example, dating from 1690: the Sejm court held that persons staying outside the 
country may take an oath in writing, which they are to sign; the clerk noted that this ensued 
vi praeiudicati iudiciorum comitalium, J. Rafacz, Z dziejów prawa rzymskiego w Polsce. 
Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Leona Pinińskiego, Lvov 1936, p. 200. Cf. J. Michalski, op.cit., 
pp. 180–287, who also takes note of and comments on that precedent.
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Precedents in sixteenth-century legal compilations
The significance of precedents as sources of law is validated—albeit 
to a varying degree—by the numerous legal compilations written in 
the sixteenth century, whose authors (with the probable exception of 
J. Sierakowski and his Układy) expected that they would be adopted as 
binding. Those are works by J. Przyłuski, J. Sierakowski, J. Herburt, 
S. Sarnicki and J. Januszowski. Among the diverse provisions of land 
law, the jurists also cite those which originated with the adjudications of 
the royal courts. 
Przyłuski’s compilation is particularly important as far as the matter 
discussed here is concerned; by and large, the remaining jurists followed 
his example with respect to the selection of material.112 The four prec-
edents which Przyłuski incorporated into his compilation113 pertained to 
distinct legal issues: inordinata citatio (precedent from 1537),114 aboli-
tion of the penalty of two oxen for failure to appear for trial (also from 
1537),115 proof of nobility of a deceased (killed) noble (date unknown)116, 
and court prosecutors (1548).117 We shall discuss the two first precedents, 
as they offer some insight into how judicial rulings came to acquire the 
force of statute. 
The first precedent is associated with citatio inordinata, a petition 
which employed defamatory language to describe the defendant. The 
king prohibited such suits under the penalty of a week’s incarceration in 
112 For example, J. Herburt’s Statuta Regni Poloniae plagiarizes Przyłuski’s compilation, 
cf. H. Grajewski, op.cit., pp. 123–129.
113 Likewise, H. Grajewski, op.cit., p. 122, who also identified four precedents in the work by 
Przyłuski.
114 J. Przyłuski, op.cit., pp. 48, 647. Cf. H. Grajewski, op.cit., pp. 122, 14017. H. Grajewski 
meticulously lists all the writers who cited that precedent as well as others after Przyłuski.
115 J. Przyłuski, op.cit., p. 637. Cf. H. Grajewski, op.cit., pp. 122,14430.
116 J. Przyłuski, op.cit., p. 287; cf. H. Grajewski, op.cit., pp. 122, 15248.
117 J. Przyłuski, op.cit., p. 598. One may doubt whether the regulation stemmed from a royal 
judgment, but this is very probable. H. Grajewski found a mention that the act was referred 
to as edictum iudiciarium, op.cit., pp. 12238, 13915. 
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the tower.118 The ruling features a technical term denoting precedent: de-
cretum (regium) in vim statuti. Naturally, the word decretum refers to the 
judgment rather than any legislative act of the monarch.119 In an adden-
dum in the margin, Przyłuski even provides the names of parties to the lit-
igation (Sigismundus. Decretum inter Strzałkowski et Kołaczkowski),120 
while S. Sarnicki reported later that the judgment followed a dispute be-
tween two nobles of Ruthenia.121 The regulation was to apply in the fu-
ture (perpetuis temporibus) in all land law courts; thus it pertained not 
only to the aforementioned dispute but also to all prospective conten-
tions of that kind. It was formulated in the refined form of an abstract 
provision, without any case-related details of the lawsuit; this, however, 
is a matter of minor importance, as we may be certain that this piece of 
118 J. Przyłuski, op.cit., p. 48: Maiestas Regia decereto suo in vim statuti perpetuis tempori-
bus duraturi, omnibus passim tam procuratoribus quam etiam aliis personis cuiuscumque 
status et conditionibus existentibus mandare et inhibere dignata est, ne quispiam citatio-
nem inordinatam et verba in eadem quae alicuius honorem et bonam famam tangerent 
descripta, et ad praesentiam Maiestatis Regiae et iudicium suae Maiestatis et ad quodlibet 
iudicium terrestre sive castrense deferre, et de eadem proponere audeat, sub poena sessio-
nis unius septimanae in turri, per omnes in contrarium decreti suae Maiestatis praesentis 
facientes sustinendae. Przyłuski quotes the ruling yet again on p. 647. S. Sarnicki, op.cit., 
p. 750, provides it in Polish translation, and mentions it on p. 1304 as well.
119 For instance, in his Corpus Iuris Polonici O. Balzer employs the term decretum to denote 
various royal ordinances and even Sejm constitutions, cf. vol. II no. 3, 12, 22, 44, 242 and 
passim as well as vol. IV, no. 21, 40, 83. The criteria governing the use of decretum in 
the titles of particular acts are unclear; Balzer does not explain it in the preface to CIP, while 
concerning the selection of legislation for that volume he refers the reader to p. XXI of an-
other work of his, Corpus Iuris Polonici medii aevi, “Kwartalnik Historyczny” 1801, vol. 
V, pp. 49–82, 314–358, where no information on decrees can be found. Even acts whose 
contents are virtually identical are called either decretum or edictum. However, in several 
cases the acts Balzer defines as decreta are indeed royal adjudications in disputes, but those 
are disputes of the administrative kind, as we would say today. CIP III, no. 4, 5, 43, 105; 
CIP IV, no. 3, 6, 79. On the other hand, decrees (rulings) pertaining to court law are lacking 
in Balzer’s compilation.
120 J. Przyłuski, op.cit., p. 48 ; J. Herburt, op.cit., p. 37 v. Let us note that when quoting the 
inordinata citatio for the second time, Przyłuski attached an addendum typically used by 
sixteenth-century writers to designate constitutions of the Sejm. Had it not been for the ad-
dendum on p. 48, we would not know that the regulation is based on precedent. This only 
shows how difficult it may be to ascertain the basis of a regulation.
121 S. Sarnicki, op.cit., p. 1304.
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land law found its source in precedent which, incidentally, enjoyed great 
popularity among contemporary jurists.122 
The second of Przyłuski’s precedents demonstrates how problemat-
ic it is for a researcher to determine the provenance of a regulation. The 
provision which ultimately revokes the penalty of two oxen for failing 
to appear in court, dating as far back as the statutes of Kazimierz Wielki, 
is indeed called a ruling,123 but since no further details are stated124 the 
source should be approached with caution. Fortunately, the act is cited 
with a description of the case in Jan Sierakowski’s Układ, from which 
we learn that the provision originated with the verdict in a litigation be-
tween Stanisław Słupski and Jan Dębiński,125 thus lending credibility to 
the information in Przyłuski.126
Thus, the sixteenth-century compendia, most of which aspired to be-
come official compilations of laws, confirm that the royal courts turned 
out decreta in vim statuti. They also confirm that jurists at the time 
found the decreta to be a source of applicable law; otherwise, they would 
not have included them in their compilations. Nonetheless, there were 
only few: the four aforementioned authors (Przyłuski, Herburt, Sarnicki, 
Januszowski) did not go beyond the four cited precedents, while some 
of them did not even take all four into account.127 Those precedents can 
122 It was cited not only by J. Przyłuski, but also Sierakowski, Herburt, Sarnicki, Łączyński, 
Januszowski, as well as seventeenth- and eighteenth-century compendiarists. Cf. H. Gra-
jewski, op.cit., p. 14017.
123 J. Przyłuski, op.cit., p. 637; Decretum Sigism Cracov 1537. The essential text of the pro-
vision reads as follows: Sacra M. R. decernere dignata est, quia prefatae poenae a con-
demnatione in contumacia, a nulla parte citata, in nullis iudiciis, tarn regalibus quam 
terrestribus etiam castrensibus per iudicium necque per partem actoream, necque pecuniis, 
necque pignorationibus exigi, nec quovis modo recipi deberunt, nunc et in posterum de-
creto praesenti mediante.
124 For instance J. Herburt, op.cit., p. 62 v, did not remark that the act was a judicial ruling.
125 B. Ulanowski ed., Jana Sierakowskiego Układ…, Art. 934, p. 223. Cf. H. Grajewski, op.cit., 
p. 14430.
126 The provision in question was also found to have been a ruling by M. Zalaszowski, Ius 
Regni Poloniae, vol. II, Poznań 1702, p. 503.
127 For instance, the proof of the nobility of a murdered noble was taken into consideration as 
a precedent only by Przyłuski, cf. H. Grajewski, op.cit., p. 15248.
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also be found in Sierakowski’s Układ, although it is possible that the 
latter volume also includes another one.128 
The Creation of Precedents in the Crown Tribunal
The end of the sixteenth century saw precedents established by a new 
court, namely the Crown Tribunal. The fact that the Tribunal created 
precedents does not seem to have had any explicit legislative foundation 
in the acts relating to that court. The aforementioned A. Lisiecki ar-
gued that relevant grounds had been provided by the Nieszawa article129, 
but they may also be sought in a statement in the Sejm enactment of 
1578 which established the Tribunal. It was declared at the time that the 
rulings of the Tribunal are to carry such weight as those of the Sejm.130 
The formula most likely sufficed to make the Tribunal feel competent 
to deliver precedential judgments. If there was a rule that royal courts 
(especially Sejm ones) were able to create precedents, then, by virtue 
of that formula, the Tribunal could be invested with the same powers. 
O. Balzer observes that the act of 1578 set forth that the judges were to 
adjudicate following written law; however, the same author finds that 
the directive operated only when such law existed.131 What is more, Bal-
zer writes that the 1578 enactment does not include the provision from 
the initial drafts of the Tribunal act from 1574, which stipulated that 
a matter unregulated by law (novum emergens) was to be referred from 
the Tribunal to the Sejm. According to Balzer, that was a deliberate mea-
sure aiming to extend the competence of the Tribunal to cases that were 
128 J. Sierakowski, Układ, Art. 168, 188, 412, 475, 934. It is possible that art. 269, on the per-
petuity of entries executed in Cuiavia before a starosta, is based on precedent (the provi-
sion relies on litterae regiae in conventu generali in vim statuti obtentae). M. Bobrzyński, 
O nieznanym układzie prawa polskiego przez Jana Sierakowskiego z r. 1554, “Rozprawy 
Akademii Umiejętności. Wydział historyczno-filozoficzny” 1877, vol. VI, Kraków 1877, 
pp. 274–275, writes that Sierakowski quoted 3 precedents.
129 Cf. page above.
130 VL II, p. 183, f. 964.
131 O. Balzer, Geneza Trybunału…, p. 327.
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beyond the scope of statute and custom, thus granting the Tribunal pow-
ers to deliver judgments in vim statuti. Let us also note that the later con-
stitution of 1607 ensured exclusive jurisdiction of the Sejm court over 
nova emergentia,132 but its effectiveness seems doubtful given that the 
Tribunal—which is further discussed below—continued to establish 
precedents. 
A number of facts demonstrate that the Crown Tribunal made rul-
ings which had the force of statute. 
In his work on the tribunal, A. Lisiecki wrote that next to written 
law, members of the Tribunal — — shall observe the praeiudicata of 
their antecessors as well, for also iuris scripti auctoritatem obtinent 
et sunt iuris scripti vivae voces.133 Lisiecki thus attributed the force of 
the written (statutory) law to the precedents issuing from the Tribunal 
and concluded that they are the living voice (i.e. interpretation as I un-
derstand it) of that law. He wrote that in 1638, three decades after the 
constitution of 1607 had been passed and some years after the 1627 con-
stitution prohibiting creation of precedents,134 which shows that despite 
proscription the Tribunal continued to establish precedents. 
A number of other facts offer further evidence that precedents were 
both created at the Tribunal and used. Its rulings were quoted by vari-
ous authors (chiefly seventeenth-century ones), whose disquisitions 
about the applicability of a given norm relied on the substance of judg-
ments delivered by the Tribunal (cf. below, VIII). Finally, let us note that 
seventeenth-century references to the rulings of the Tribunal mention 
that they had a “legislative taste”,135 or—as some happened to put it—
“exuded the force of statute” (vim legis sapiunt). Efforts were undertak-
en to curb them and, from 1627, they were pronounced invalid, but the 
campaign against such decrees of the Tribunal—waged to little effect in 
any case (cf. IX below)—confirms that for a long time after its establish-
132 Cf. page above. 
133 A. Lisiecki, op.cit., p. 179.
134 Cf. page below. 
135 The expression comes from W. Maisel, op.cit., p. 91.
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ment in 1578 that judicial body continued to deliver judgments that had 
the force of precedent. 
Compendia of Judgments and Use of 
Judgments in Private Collections of Law
The significance of judicial rulings as sources of law is eloquently attested 
by two practices witnessed chiefly in the seventeenth century: 1) the cre-
ation of special compilations of judgments and legal rules based on such 
verdicts136, 2) the inclusion of rulings in private collections of land law. 
When publishing the 1544 Puncta, M. Bobrzyński drew attention to 
the existence of several sixteenth-century manuscripts four of which (la-
belled by the publisher as B, C, D, E) contain an assortment of judgments 
and, occasionally, legal rules based on verdicts from that century.137 Most 
of those are decreta of the court in curia or the Sejm court held in Kraków, 
but a number of rulings and rules originate from outside that town. While 
discussing the contents of those manuscripts, for which he also collated 
a synoptic table, Bobrzyński speaks of a collection (as opposed to col-
lections) of judgments, as if he meant only one work which was modi-
fied as the body of relevant material increased. This probably warranted 
S. Kutrzeba’s conclusion that “the compilation was subsequently revised 
and expanded, so that several redactions exist as a result” (further on Kutr-
zeba mentions four, as there were four manuscripts).138 The fifth text has 
been discovered only recently.139 In a valuable paper devoted to the is-
sue, the authors presume—just as Kutrzeba did—that the original collec-
tion was mechanically expanded in the successive redactions.140 More-
over, the authors consider the newly discovered text to have been linked 
136 As already observed, the provisions which established a legal rule assumed a more abstract 
and refined form in comparison with the ruling on which it was based. 
137 M. Bobrzyński, Puncta…, op.cit., pp. 195–203.
138 S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł…, op.cit., p. 157.
139 I. Dwornicka, W. Uruszczak, op.cit., p. 186.
140 Ibidem, p. 185.
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to the previously mentioned and provide a diagram—though not a very 
clear one—showing how they are interrelated.141 And yet, it follows from 
Bobrzyński’s argument and the table he collated that only manuscripts 
B and C are closely interconnected (C is an expanded version of B, in that 
it includes other, chiefly later rulings), but that no particular cohesion can 
be observed in other relationships between the four texts (which indeed 
display marked differences).
The issue certainly requires expert source studies, but even at this 
point it would seem more appropriate to state that in the sixteenth cen-
tury there was no one uniform collection but that diverse (and numer-
ous) compilations of rulings were in fact made.142 Similarities between 
them are understandable, given that they relied on a homogenous body 
of material (the judgments of the royal courts) and the technique em-
ployed in their making (the compilers are likely to have copied the text 
from one another). 
Clearly, the rulings of the royal courts were an object of interest in 
the sixteenth century and, as may be inferred from the numerous surviv-
ing manuscripts, lists of such judgments were compiled for practical 
reasons. As J. Rafacz observes, “a number of examples demonstrate that 
jurists-practitioners strove to have such collections of contemporary and 
earlier decrees, so as to be able to substantiate pleas as patrons [attor-
neys], judges, or instigators [prosecutors].”143 
Later on, however, making compilations of rulings of the royal 
courts did not become a more widespread practice. No seventeenth- or 
eighteenth-century collections of that kind are known to date. If, there-
fore, J. Makarewicz writes that “in order to record precedential rulings, 
they were promulgated in print”,144 the assertion carries little relevance 
as it refers only to a minor brochure from 1689 published in Lublin by 
141 The diagram lacks a detailed description and explanation, ibidem, p. 191.
142 Cf. also J. Rafacz, Dawne prawo sądowe polskie w zarysie, Warszawa 1936, p. 29.
143 Ibidem. Cf. also S. Sarnicki’s views on the usefulness of compilations of rulings in educat-
ing legal professionals. 
144 J. Makarewicz, op.cit., p. 13.
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the Jesuits. It merely contained three decrees of the tribunal of Lublin 
from 1687–1688, issued in diverse cases against religious dissenters and 
Jews. Admittedly, its title145 endorses the significance and usefulness of 
Tribunal judgments for prospective cases of the same kind, but its pub-
lication does not attest to a broader publishing activity dedicated to the 
rulings of the highest courts. 
Another fact suggesting that judgments became sources of law is 
that they were used for private compilations of applicable law. This has 
already been noted with respect to the fifteenth century compendium 
of laws and customs of Łęczyca, which comprised a range of judgments 
delivered by land and municipal courts (see III). The trend continues 
in the sixteenth century: norms deriving from the decrees of the roy-
al courts are integrated into legal compilations, as exemplified by two 
Lesser Polish compendia: Cautelae, created in the first half of the six-
teenth century (between 1521 and 1550)146 and Puncta from 1544.147
Two (out of 22) articles in Cautelae are based on judicial rulings, 
namely articles 18 and 21. The first of those draws on the judgment 
of the royal court of June 13 1521,148 according to which royal confir-
mation cannot render an invalid act in law valid and, specifically, a royal 
decision cannot convalidate the testamentary appointment of a guardian 
when such an appointment has not been executed before the king or land 
court.149 The second case (Art. 21) is formulated into a legal rule which 
stipulates that a widow with an assured dower has to accept money from 
relatives wishing to recover the dower by purchase not in the first but 
only in the second court-decreed period. The rule was supplemented 
with the typically phrased justification, worded as follows: inter con-
145 Ad perpetuam rei memoriam trina decreta tribunalitia Ecclesiae Romanae viris ecclesias-
ticis et praesertim curam animarum administratibus, religionem catholicam zelore promo-
tentibus, haeresim calvinisticam et scandala iudaica prosequentibus utilia, Lublin 1689.
146 AKP IX, pp. 199–216.
147 For the full title of the compilation v. footnote 14.
148 The exact date is known thanks to M. Bobrzyński, Decreta…, p. 179.
149 The description of the case in S. Kutrzeba, Zastępcy stron w dawnym procesie polskim, 
Kraków–Warszawa 1923.
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sortem Pauli Mruk et lohannem Zabawski Regia Maiestas iudiciumąue 
decrevit sic.150
Even more regulations deriving from judgments are found inter-
spersed throughout the Puncta. This is a collection of provisions taken 
from diverse sources and laws: land law rulings, customary law, canon 
and Magdeburg law, from the 1532 Correction of Laws and constitu-
tions of the Sejm.151
The compilation comprises 169 articles, but upon examination only 
several can be qualified as having originated with judicial rulings. The 
articles in question contain more or less precise information that they 
had been derived from judgments. The information, provided as a kind 
of rationale which sanctions the binding force of a given provision, is 
formulated in a variety of manners. The most frequently used phrase 
is ut est (or fuit) decretum inter (after which the names of parties to 
the respective lawsuit are supplied).152 One also encounters other justifi-
cations, such as quod hoc fuit practicatum in conventione — — (which 
refers to the Sejm court)153 or phrases which in a sense highlight the 
exemplary nature of the ruling: — — ut est exemplaris probation,154 or 
exempli gratia ut est factum.155 Based on such indications, fourteen out 
of 169 articles can be identified as regulations conveying legal norms 
derived from judgments.156 Apart from that, there are five articles which 
consist of rulings incorporated into the compilation.157
150 Ibidem. 
151 M. Bobrzyński, Introduction to Puncta, p. 199. However, the author does not mention con-
stitutions of the sejm.
152 Puncta, Art. 19, 40, 87, 88, 94, 112, 166. On this subject cf. I. Dwornicka, W. Uruszczak, 
op.cit., p. 189.
153 Puncta, Art. 22.
154 Ibidem, Art. 24.
155 Ibidem, Art. 48.
156 Art. 12, 13, 19, 22, 24, 40, 48 (the rules they contain are also to be found in the source dis-
covered by I. Dwornicka, W. Uruszczak, op.cit., pp. 194–195; note: unlike the aforesaid au-
thors, I believe that the Puncta proper do not go beyond Art. 169; Cf. also M. Bobrzyński, 
Introduction to the Puncta…, p. 195) and further: Art. 87, 88, 92, 94, 111, 112, 166.
157 Art. 150–154, all in one column: Decreta quaedam per dominum olim Lyubomirski protunc 
iudicem Cracoviensem pro informatione tenenda. Anno Domini 1509. M. Bobrzyński in 
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The table drawn up by I. Dwornicka and W. Uruszczak for the 
source they discovered (BJ, Cim. F. 8048) enables broader identifica-
tion, as it demonstrates that further nineteen articles in the Puncta orig-
inated with precedents.158 This is a splendid example of how a newly 
discovered source offers better insights into the already known ones. 
Thanks to a comparison of both sources, one can conclude beyond any 
doubt that at least thirty eight articles (22%) in the compilation known 
the Puncta had their origins in precedent. There is another observa-
tion that this situation occasions, namely that many provisions of law 
very swiftly—as the example of the nineteen articles demonstrates—
became detached from the foundation which rendered them binding, 
i.e. from the judicial ruling. 
We are not going to delve here into the contents of particular judg-
ment-based articles in the Puncta. The substance of most can be inferred 
from the aforementioned table collated by the Kraków authors and in 
this reference.159
Precedents in the Commentaries 
of Historical Polish Jurists
As a basis for Polish land law, precedents were also used by the com-
mentators on that law. Discussing the latter, they would not infrequently 
cite the judgments of the royal courts and tribunals, thus treating them as 
Puncta identifies them as rulings of the municipal court. It may therefore be conjectured 
that judgments of the lower courts were able to become precedents in the early sixteenth 
century as well.
158 Art. 10, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 23, 31, 32, 33, 35, 36, 41, 44, 51, 56, 57, 59, 106. Cf. I. Dwor-
nicka, W. Uruszczak, op.cit., pp. 194–195.
159 I. Dwornicka, W. Uruszczak, op.cit. I provide table locations for the precedent-containing ar-
ticles which are not found in the newly discovered manuscript, BJ, Cim. F. 8048. Art. 87—De 
summa excedente decem marcas; Art. 88 — De citationibus indivise factis; Art. 92—De prae-
scriptione dominae dotalitialis; Art. 94 — De probatione vulnerum; Art. 111—De poena kocz 
in indicio commissariali;  Art. 112—De exemptione dominae dotalitialis; Art. 166—De ter-
mini concitati dilatione in indicio petenda. As already observed, Art. 150—154, being cop-
ies of judicial rulings, are entered into one column. Cf. footnote 156. 
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a source of law. This approach is evident in the writings of S. Sarnicki, 
T. Zawacki, G. Czaradzki and M. Zalaszowski.
Sarnicki (in the commentary following his compilation of laws) 
quotes only five precedents, including one discussed in greater detail 
above,160 as well as a decree stating that a petition for the payment of 
dower is not subject to prescription, a decree on the division of immov-
able property and two precedents taken from the statutes of Kazimierz 
Wielki.161 This is not an extensive set and, given its contents, not a very 
significant one either. It could be omitted in these deliberations, were it 
not for the remark of Sarnicki’s regarding the importance of precedents. 
Sarnicki describes the training of a beginner legal practitioner whom 
he calls a novice at law (novitius iuris). The author writes thus: The 
second method of practicing. They divide it [i.e. that method – B.L.] 
into four. First, the forms of various records are gathered by those who 
wish to proficere expeditiously. Then the forms of diverse pleas and 
suits, the munimenta maiora et interlocutoria come third, and fourth, 
the decrees before the royal court, the tribunal, as well as land and 
municipal courts — —.162 It follows that the study of rulings delivered 
at the various courts of nobility was one of the fundamental methods 
(next to other three) in the education of a legal professional. This is 
stressed by Sarnicki himself in connection with the precedents he cited: 
It would have been fitting to supply more such decrees here, for they 
may be a source of ample knowledge for the novitius, yet it is odiosum 
to mention persons by name, which is why one should refrain there-
from. However, the novitius may sit with the land judges and municipal 
ones, at royal courts and the tribunals and there take note, in especial 
when a singular casus happens to occur — — .163 
160 Precedent relating to inappropriate petition, cf. p. 18 above.
161 S. Sarnicki, op.cit., p. 1304.
162 Ibidem, p. 1301.
163 lbidem, pp. 1304–1305. Sarnicki justifies the meagre assortment of decrees by explaining 
that one should not cite more for fear of disclosing the names of persons involved in the 
disputes, which would be odiosum. Other authors, such as Zawacki as well as Czaradzki 
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The use of precedents in legal education indicates that they were in-
deed employed in legal practice. After all, one can hardly imagine a situa-
tion where “novices” were required to learn something that was irrelevant 
to the application of law at the time. 
The works of Teodor Zawacki deserve particular attention. As we 
know, he published a volume based primarily on judicial practice and 
the rulings of the Crown Tribunal, encompassing rules within land law 
which the author provided in alphabetical order.164 The author discussed 
Polish law whilst relying on judgments but the entire material was sup-
plied in a spruced-up form, without citing the original source. Hence we 
do not learn about the actual substance of rulings nor the time when the 
Tribunal delivered them, but this does not undermine Zawacki’s cred-
ibility. We do believe that he took advantage of sententiae seu praeiu-
dicata to which he refers in the title. The fact is evinced in his thorough 
knowledge of numerous verdicts of royal courts and tribunals, a splen-
did sample of which may be found in his chief work on the judicial pro-
cess. Even in the preface to the work, dedicated to Feliks Kryski, the au-
thor remarked that he used royal judgments as well as adjudications and 
precedents of the Tribunal.165 Although subsequent editions feature no 
such mentions, the fact that judgments are so frequently quoted proves 
that Zawacki did see them as the mainstay of land law, alongside custom 
and statutes. Let us illustrate this assertion with the material in the most 
comprehensive (and the most convenient to cite) edition of Processus 
from 1619.166 
and Zalaszowski did not have such scruples and provided numerous precedents along with 
the names of the litigating parties. 
164 T. Zawacki, Flosculi practici ex communi praxi et forma ac consuetudine iudiciorum 
frequentibusque summi Tribunalis Regm Poloniae sententiis seu praeiudicatis decerpti, 
Kraków 1623; Cf. M. Bobrzyński, Introduction to Puncta…, p. 203; S. Kutrzeba, Historia 
źródeł…, I, op.cit., p. 158.
165 T. Zawacki, Processus iudiciarius Regni Poloniae, Kraków 1612: Adhibitis itaque statu-
torum et constitutionum Regni Poloniae libris, regum decretis, summique R. P. Tribunalis 
sententiis et praeiudicatis, tractatum collegi et collustravi.
166 Contrary to the truth, S. Kutrzeba, Historia źródeł…, I, p. 280 states that Zawacki revised 
and expanded his work with each successive edition, “until it reached very substantial vol-
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The latter edition includes as many as ninety two references to the 
rulings of the nobility courts, i.e. the royal courts and the Tribunal.167 
Predominant among the decrees of the royal courts are those deliv-
ered by the Sejm court (in conventu) while judgments of the assesso-
rial (in curia)168 or relational court (in relationibus) occur only sporadi-
cally.169 Certain mentions do not specify which type of court was in-
volved.170 In total, there are seventy two references to particular rulings 
of the royal courts dating from 1519–1599.171 The remaining mentions 
refer to the judgments of the Tribunal. There are twenty of those, in-
cluding four delivered by the Tribunal in Piotrków172, and nine by the 
Tribunal in Lublin173, while the remainder (seven mentions) do not in-
dicate the seat of the Tribunal.174 The Tribunal decrees quoted by Za-
wacki were made between 1579 and 1596.175 The names of the parties 
are provided with a portion of the decrees (twenty two in total), but for 
ume”. For instance, the fourth edition of 1637 is less extensive than the edition of 1619; 
it is similar to the 1612 edition, both of which are the abridged versions of Processus. The 
editions of 1619 and 1647 represent the extended versions (I have not seen the 1616 edi-
tion). The volume published in 1619 is more convenient, because—unlike the one from 
1647—it features numerical pagination. The extended version differs from the abridged in 
that it includes twelve titles (as opposed to ten in the shorter editions). The additional titles 
are: De iuramentis VIII, De poenis XI. Title II De actionibus was supplemented with mate-
rial entitled De citationibus.
167 Processus iudiciarius Regni Poloniae, Kraków 1619: pp. 3(2), 4(3), 503), 6(1), 7(2), 8(2), 
9(1), 10(2), 11(3), 16(2), 23(1), 24(2), 30(1), 32(1), 30(3), 34(1), 38(3), 42(2), 43(1), 44(1), 
45(2), 50(3), 51(2), 52(2), 53(2), 54(1), 55(5), 56(2), 57(4), 58(5), 59(1), 60(1), 61(2), 
66(1), 67(2), 69(2), 71(1), 85(2), 123(2), 126(1), 131(1), 132(1), 144(1), 157(11), 161(1), 
172(1), 184(1), 187(3), 190(1), 191(1). The ruling of Zygmunt August cited on p. 211 is 
concerned with a distinct jurisdiction, i.e. municipal. The numbers in parentheses above 
indicate the quantity of decrees on the respective pages.
168 Ibidem, p. 4.
169 Ibidem, p. 32.
170 Ibidem, pp. 5, 55.
171 Cf. ibidem, pp. 4, 56, 67.
172 Ibidem, pp. 50, 59, 123.
173 Ibidem, pp. 4, 16, 24, 33, 50, 91, 53, 144, 190.
174 Ibidem, pp. 10, 16, 24, 44, 59, 66, 161.
175 Cf. ibidem, pp. 59, 161.
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the most part Zawacki kept the judgments anonymous and chose not to 
disclose the parties. 
A fair number of decrees (thirty nine) were included in Title I of 
the work: De obligationibus et eas sequentibus inscripcionibus (pp. 
1–46). Despite what the heading may suggest, the title is concerned 
with both obligations and related entries into court ledgers, as well 
as cases which, according to the current systematics, would belong 
elsewhere. Besides that, the only area that Zawacki’s work does not 
cover are matters of litigation; in the present-day classification, many 
of those are recognized as part of substantive law. For this reason, the 
aforementioned title (as well as others) the precedent-based material is 
quite diverse. In Title I, court decrees resolve such issues as: the form 
of entries into court records (books), so-called personal entries, the 
legal capacity of wards and unmarried girls, the legal capacity of mar-
ried women, the disposal of immovable property, dower and dowry, or 
security (vadium) in obligations. 
The majority of decrees (forty one in total) were included in Ti-
tle II, De actionibus et citationibus (pp. 47–127), with judgments per-
taining to succession, forcible ejectment from estate (violenta expulsio), 
domestic invasion, buyout of property (in the broadest sense, i.e. under 
various legal titles), fugitive peasantry, actions and their filing, or the le-
gal status of the wife of an outlaw. Title III, De processu (pp. 128–148), 
contains only three judgments, concerning the lucrum of the plaintiff, the 
purchase of minor liabilities on the estate of the debtor by a major credi-
tor, and the procedure with citatio ad banniendum. Three further rul-
ings are cited in Title V, De dilationibus (pp. 153–183); two pertain 
to trial adjournments and one to warranty. Another judgment, this time 
on the contestation of suit, is found in the title dedicated to that very is-
sue (De litis contestatione, pp. 183–184). Three decrees are quoted in 
Title VIII, De iuramentis (pp. 185–189), two of which are connected 
with oath and one with the liability of the depositary. Two final decrees 
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were included in Title IX, De appellationibus (pp. 189–196); both focus 
on appellate instruments of mocja [recusal] and gravamen. 
This brief overview of the decrees cited by Zawacki demonstrates 
the importance that the author attached to the yield of adjudication,176 
as the substantial part of his foremost work relies precisely on judicial 
rulings. Clearly, that outstanding jurist177 was thoroughly convinced that 
judgements of the royal courts and the tribunals establish law, that those 
are decreta in vim legis. The fact that Zawacki acknowledged rulings as 
sources of law is a cogent argument in favour of recognizing the prece-
dential import of verdicts delivered by the royal courts and the Tribunal. 
A number of decrees, fifteen to be precise, were quoted by Grze-
gorz Czaradzki. The rulings may also be found in Zawacki’s Processus, 
which is probably where Czaradzki took them from.178 Thus, while ap-
preciating the value of precedents for the law at the time, Czaradzki—
unlike Zawacki—did not contribute anything new in that respect. 
A considerable number of precedents established by the royal courts 
and the Crown Tribunal were used by Mikołaj Zalaszowski: seventy-
six according to my calculation. However, the majority are rulings as-
sociated with municipal law, usually quoted after Lipski,179 although 
in some instances it is difficult to determine whether a given precedent 
176 And, in a broader sense, to practice and custom, to which he conspicuously referred using 
phrases such as secundum stylum practicorum, talis est praxis, usus et praxis, sic intelligunt 
practici, consuetudo.
177 In the field of land law, Teodor Zawacki was arguably the best jurist of pre-partition Poland 
in view of his ingenuity and independent juridical thought, many examples of which may 
be found in his writings. These are also highly regarded by S. Kutrzeba as well as earlier 
authors, such as K. B. Steiner. Cf. S. Salmonowicz, Krystian Bogumił Steiner (1746–1814), 
toruński prawnik i historyk, Toruń 1962, p. 110103.
178 G. Czaradzki, Proces sądowny ziemskiego prawa koronnego…, op.cit., Warszawa 1640. 
Three rulings on p. 4 (pp. 4, 5 in Zawacki, edition of 1619), six rulings on p. F1 (Zawacki, 
pp. 5, 6. 8, 9, 10), three rulings on p. F1v (Zawacki, pp. 10, 16, 33) and three rulings on 
p. F2 (Zawacki, pp. 33 and 38). Czaradzki had already borrowed precedents for the first 
edition of his work (1614) from the abridged version (Cf. footnote 165 above) of Zawacki’s 
volume, i.e. from the 1612 edition, which is evinced in how the former cites the dates of 
judgments and the names of the involved parties. 
179 On that issue cf. also remarks by I. Malinowska, Mikołaj Zalaszowski, Kraków 1960, p. 81.
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pertains to municipal or land law. It seems that thirty four precedents are 
linked to land law, but again most of those were sourced from Zawacki’s 
work, whom Zalaszowski credits in half (seventeen) of the cited judg-
ments.180 In one case, Zalaszowski drew on J. Przyłuski,181 whereas for 
the remainder the author most likely availed himself of the papers left 
by his uncle, the royal notary Jan Oktawian Wacławowicz, to which he 
alludes quite explicitly.182 
As a result, the judgments quoted by Zalaszowski do not offer as 
much material as Zawacki’s work. Taken largely from the latter and 
other authors, they date back to the sixteenth century, while only a few 
originate from the seventeenth century. Their informative value is mod-
est, yet they attest that Zalaszowski, a late seventeenth century jurist, 
considered them a part of the land law in force. 
Prohibition on the Creation of Tribunal Precedents
The assault on the decrees in vim legis began in the seventeenth century. 
It is likely to have been directed against the Tribunal decrees, because 
neither local diets (sejmiki) nor the Sejm ever turned openly against the 
decrees of the royal courts, i.e. the Sejm and the assessorial court. 
The first attack followed in the wake of a case which in 1627 in-
censed—to judge by the response of the sejmiki—a substantial part of 
180 Here are the pages in the work by M. Zalaszowski, Ius Regni Poloniae, vol. II, Poznań 
1702, where one can find the land law precedents; information in the parentheses indicates 
where those precedents are cited in T. Zawacki Processus from 1619, pp. 79, 113, 236 (two 
precedents), 354 (Zawacki, p. 51), 362 (Zawacki. p. 50), 363 (Zawacki, p. 51), 389, 404, 
410 (Zawacki, p. 33), 425 (Zawacki, p. 33), 431 (two precedents), 433 (two precedents), 
441 (two precedents — in Zawacki both on p. 3), 444 (Zawacki, p. 9), 446 (Zawacki, p. 5), 
448 (Zawacki, p. 11), 450 (two precedents — in Zawacki both on p. 16), 458, 481, 496, 499, 
503, 536 (three precedents — one allegedly after Zawacki), 661 (Zawacki, p. 24), 670, 677 
(Zawacki, p. 69), 679 (Zawacki, p. 66).
181 M. Zalaszowski, op.cit., p. 503 (decree of King Zygmunt of 1537, on the abolishment of 
oxen penalty for contumacy (cf. pp. 18–19 above); this one in indeed cited in Przyłuski’s 
work, op.cit., p. 637.
182 M. Zalaszowski, op.cit., pp. 489–490: ex cuius connotatis plurima decreta in curia regali 
lata passim hic adferro. Cf. I. Malinowska, op.cit., p. 82.
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the nobility. That year, the Calvinist Samuel Świętopełk Bolestraszycki 
was sentenced by the Tribunal in Lublin to six months of incarceration 
and four hundred grzywna for publishing a Polish translation of Pierre 
du Moulin’s work on the papacy.183 The sentence was vehemently op-
posed in the instructions for the Sejm deputies issued by the sejmiki of 
the following provinces and regions: Poznań and Kalisz in Środa (Au-
gust 31st)184, Kraków in Proszowice (August 31st)185, Ruthenia in Wisz-
nia (August 31st),186 Zator and Oświęcim in Zator (August 28th).187
As one can infer from the protests of the local assemblies, the Tri-
bunal in Lublin appended the future effect clause (in vim legis) to the 
decree in Bolestraszycki’s case, as a measure intended against Prot-
estants.188 The instructions for the voivodeships of Poznań and Kalisz 
suggest that the provision prohibited the prospective establishment of 
dissident associations.189 The opinion of the sejmiki was unequivocal: 
the decree against Bolestraszycki, or rather that fact that it had been 
granted the force of statute, was condemned, using a variety of justifica-
tions, such as the need for internal peace190 or the Tribunal’s groundless 
usurpation of the power to deliver rulings in vim legis, which it did not 
possess.191
183 V. Akta sejmikowe województwa krakowskiego, ed. A. Przyboś Hereinafter: ASWK. 
Cf. W. Sobociński, O historii sądownictwa w Polsce magnackiej XVIII w., “Czasopismo 
Prawno-Historyczne” 1901, XIII, fasc. 1, p. 145.
184 Akta sejmikowe województwa poznańskiego i kaliskiego, ed. W. Dworzaczek — hereinafter 
ASWPKJ, I, 2, no. 311, p. 249; cf. W. Maisel, op.cit., p. 91.
185 ASWK, vol. II, 1, p. 89; cf. W. Maisel, op.cit.
186 Akta grodzkie i ziemskie Hereinafte: AGZ.
187 ASWK, vol. II, 1, p. 74.
188 The addition of the clause stating that the judgment has the force of statute is mentioned in 
the resolution of the sejmik of Wisznia and the Sejm constitution of 1627, also cited below. 
189 ASWPK: Hence the decrees in vim legis abolishing associations inter dissidentes de re-
ligione in futurum must not be introduced, for so much depends on having internal peace 
undisturbed.
190 Instructions of Poznań and Kalisz cf. preceding footnote. W. Maisel, op.cit., observes somewhat 
exaggeratedly that the position of the Greater Polish diet was presented “in a splendidly substan-
tiated legal argument”. Meanwhile, the rationale was limited to keeping internal peace. 
191 The Instruction of Zator: “and since the tribunal court usurps greater autoritatis that the 
written law permits, and creates new actions that lie outside it purview;” instruction of 
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However, the demands went further than revoking the future statuto-
ry effect of Bolestraszycki’s decree. The postulations of the nobles were 
more general: the Tribunal should no longer deliver judgments with 
the force of statute or adjudicate in matters beyond its competence. 
This was clearly what the instruction of the Kraków voivodeship aimed 
for;192 Greater Polish193 and Ruthenian194 instructions were formulated 
along similar lines.
The Sejm of 1627 took those demands into account. In the constitu-
tion dated November 23rd (On the tribunal decrees), it held as follows: 
“The Tribunal, having no potestatem condendarum legum, should judge 
in pursuance of the laws enacted by the whole of the Commonwealth, 
whereas matters that are not described in law must not be admitted for 
adjudication, nor poenas irrogare and aggravare anyone with those be-
yond that which is laid down in universal law; and where there should 
be such decrees or clauses which vim legis saperent or interfere with 
popular peace, as did happen with some additamenta in certain decrees 
of the past Tribunal of Lublin, then none shall be liable under those, for 
they are to be nullitati subesse instead.”195 
the Kraków voivodeship: “by which [i.e. the decree in Bolestraszycki’s case – B.L.] the tri-
bunal supra concessam sibi it is granted by R. P. potestatem and the powers described in 
law, sinned contra maiestatem publicam in that it condendo a law, which is the exclusive 
prerogative of R. P.;” instruction of the voivodeship of Ruthenia: “may a constitution pre-
scribe that the Tribunal courts and its decrees be germane only to those cases that they were 
delegated under the late lamented His Majesty King Stefan and which were laid down for 
them in later constitutions, so that the gentlemen deputies may not make the decrees into 
laws to be used conveniently against us, who are not in lite; which is what they now usur-
parunt in appendice of the decree with Right Honourable Mr Samuel Bolestraszycki, for 
these maiestatem et potestatem are held exclusively by the Commonwealth in the assembly 
of three estates at the sejm.” 
192 ASWK: “If in time to come any tribunal dares to make and issue such decrees that vim 
leges saperent, may they have no consequence.” 
193 ASWPK: The decrees of the tribunals, whose focus is on the litigantes partes themselves yet 
to other honori may prove detrimental, it shall be restricted that they may solely be valid 
inter partes litigantes.
194 Cf. footnote 190.
195 VL III, p. 263, f. 547; Cf. M. Goyski, op.cit., pp. 307–308.
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Thus the Sejm took three important decisions: 1) the Tribunal has no 
legislative powers; 2) the jurisdiction of the Tribunal extends as far as 
the existing law, but it cannot hear new cases (“not described” in law); 
3) if the Tribunal delivers judgements “exuding” the force of statute or 
provided with the clause vim legis, then such rulings shall be ineffective. 
The constitution of 1627 was to put an end to the Tribunal’s prac-
tice of passing judgments in vim legis, and simultaneously resolved—to 
the disadvantage of the Tribunal—with respect to new cases (or “new 
actions” as they were called at the time).196 The effect, however, must 
have been quite exiguous because in a constitution of 1638 (On the tri-
bunal decrees in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) the Sejm 
observed that: — — since in that [i.e. the matter of decrees regulated by 
the 1627 enactment – B.L.] popular law is not satisfactorily obeyed — 
—, and pronounced that: — — the Tribunal must in all adhere to the 
aforesaid law [of 1627].197 
It would appear that reaffirming that provision did not achieve the 
results that the nobility wished to see. In an instruction for deputies 
dated January 11th, 1645, the nobles of the Ruthenian voivodeship de-
manded as follows: — —the decrees in genera whereas under the con-
stitutional 1627 ferre the tribunal does not possess iura legis sapien-
tia.198 The nobles of the Wołyń voivodeship called for strict observance 
of the constitution of 1627 in as many as three instructions (in 1632, 
1645 and 1646).199 The instruction which the sejmik of Kraków issued 
on November 29th, 1678, stated that the Tribunals abuse their powers 
so much that — —not only do they dare to pass decrees in vim legis sa-
pientia, which contravene the strict laws and constitutions, but also go 
against brevia Sedis Apostolicae — —.200 This suggests that the Tribu-
nals continued to resolve in the aforesaid new cases and—in the opinion 
196 Cf. the instruction of Zator in the footnote 190.
197 VL III, p. 444, f. 935; Cf. W. Maisel, op.cit., p. 92.
198 AGZ XX, no. 223, 28.
199 M. Goyski, op.cit., p. 3082.
200 ASWK IV, p. 98; Cf. W. Maisel, op.cit., p. 92.
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of the sejmik—violated the law in force by delivering judgments which 
contradicted that law. 
Such inference is also corroborated by the royal instruction of the 
sejmik of Kraków of 1680. The king, promising to abolish conflict be-
tween the Sejm court and the Tribunal in certain criminal cases, stated 
as follows: “Bearing in mind that tribunals are wont to engage in cog-
nitionem of the sejm constitutions, through which suprema iurisdictio 
et potestas of the sejm convellitur, this needs to be submitted ad cen-
suram R. P. and et ad correcturam, for if it is unbecoming to pass such 
judgements which vim legis sapiunt, then it is even less fitting to re-
voke public laws and constitutions through one’s decrees.”201 It may be 
worthwhile to add that the royal instruction refers to the fact that both 
courts employed precedents in the criminal cases which were the object 
of contention (ex utraque parte there are constitutions and praeiudicata 
invoked), demonstrating that tribunal precedents were still established 
and used in the late seventeenth century, despite having been prohib-
ited by the constitutions of 1627 and 1638. 
Consequently, non-compliance with both constitutions—at least in 
the seventeenth century and perhaps later as well—is evident. This is sup-
ported to some degree by another constitution relating to decrees in vim 
legis, which was enacted almost on the centenary of the first, in 1726, with 
the aim of reforming the Crown Tribunal. The constitution stated that: 
“The decrees which vim legis sapiunt, must not be adopted at Tribunals 
to be in effect in futurum as earlier laws dictated, and indeed reassumendo 
constitutiones annorum 1627 et 1638 they shall not be enforced, but at 
the future Tribunal shall be annulled with the exception of those which in 
parte, satisfactione aliqua, have already been accepted.”202 Thus the con-
stitution, drawing on the two previous ones, held the decrees in vim legis 
to be invalid, and laid down that they should be revoked during the next 
201 ASWK IV, p. 132; Cf. W. Maisel, op.cit., p. 92.
202 VL VI, p. 224, f. 435; Cf. J. Michalski, op.cit., p. 83.
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session of the Tribunal. The only exception was made for the judgments 
which had already been accepted by being fulfilled.203
The constitution of 1726 is the final act with respect to precedential 
rulings of the Tribunal. The question of the decrees “exuding the force of 
statute” (vim legis sapientia)204 returned in the constitution of 1768, but the 
underlying reasons were different. Perhaps already in the seventeenth cen-
tury, particularly after the promulgation of the Constitution of 1726, the al-
legation that a tribunal verdict “exudes the force of statute” began to be 
used to overturn verdicts. It was from that very standpoint that the Con-
stitution of 1768 regulated the efficacy of the novel legal measure which 
had been unknown before the seventeenth century, but which tended to be 
abused by the litigating parties and exacerbated barratry.205 However, that 
is an altogether different story of the judicial process in the declining Com-
monwealth, discussed exhaustively in the scholarly literature.206 As for the 
history of precedents, use of that measure meant weakening the legislative 
role of the Tribunal and, most likely, the end of its precedential contribution. 
Conclusions
Finally, some remarks are due by way of recapitulation, and perhaps a few 
general reflections need be made regarding the sources of land law. 
Precedents had already been established in the fourteenth and fif-
teenth century, as suggested by Constitutiones et iura terrae Lancicien-
sis. There was also a statutory basis which the sanctioned creation and 
application of precedents (the provision in the Statute of Nieszawa of 
203 W. Maisel, op.cit., seems to interpret the text similarly, stating that one made: “exception 
for the rulings which were sanctioned by their execution.” 
204 Polish translation of the expression taken from S. Estreicher, who nevertheless uses “laws” 
instead of “statutes”. Estreicher, Kultura prawnicza…, p. 79.
205 The constitution of 1768, VL VII, p. 330, f. 706, regulated the validity of those tribunal 
decrees which were alleged to vim legis sapiunt, in that it upheld the validity of the accepted 
rulings, as in the constitution of 1726, and those which were pronounced twice in the same 
case and were consistent in their content.
206 V. J. Michalski, op.cit., pp. 83, 200–211; Cf. also W. Sobociński, op.cit., pp. 145–146.
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1454), corroborated later—until the eighteenth century—by various 
Polish legal writers. One can also find direct evidence that judicial 
rulings became a source of law, as they established new norms that 
would be binding in the future. This activity was particularly tangible 
in the area of casus novi, issues unregulated by law, in which a major 
contribution should be credited to the Sejm court. Courts delivered 
judgments which possessed the force of statute, called decreta in vim 
statuti, decreta in vim legis,207 decreta vim legis sapientia or simply 
praeiudicata.208 Also, it was an established practice to invoke earlier 
rulings in court. 
Precedents also served to formulate respective provisions in legal 
compilations. Moreover, the judgments of the royal courts were col-
lected in special compendia (sixteenth century), while numerous Polish 
jurists (Teodor Zawacki in particular) considered rulings equal to con-
stitutions, citing the provisions deriving from the former as applicable 
law. Given the available sources, the sixteenth century was particularly 
propitious for precedents, quite likely marking the peak development of 
court law in Poland. It was then that a leading jurist of the century ob-
served: uno iure, unis etiam consuetudinibus ac similibus praeiudicatis 
omnes terrae totius Regni iudicentur.
The late sixteenth century saw the creation of the Crown Tribunal, 
a judicial body which also pronounced judgments that had the force 
of law. Soon enough, in the seventeenth century, such rulings began to 
be fiercely opposed, but the constantly reiterated demands of the nobil-
ity that the tribunal precedents be considered invalid shows that they 
continued to be a source of law in the seventeenth century as well. The 
207 Cf. footnote 188. Precedents in seventeenth-century Spain were referred to in a similar 
manner: sententiae Tribunalium supremorum vim legis habent. V. J. M. Scholz, Spanien. 
Rechtssprechungs—und Konsilien Sammlungen, in: Handbuch der Quellen und Literatur 
der neueren europäischen Privatrechtsgeschichte, ed. H. Coing, Munich 1976, pp. 1287–
1288; cf. W. Uruszczak, Europejskie kodeksy prawa doby renesansu, “Czasopismo Prawo-
no-Historyczne” 1988, XL, fasc. 1, p. 79.
208 Cf. footnote 164 and page above, as well as Przyłuski’s statement cited below.
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view expressed by T. Ostrowski209 suggests that the practice of establish-
ing precedents in other courts lasted until the end of the Commonwealth. 
The material presented in this paper suffices to confirm that the rul-
ings of land courts as well as the highest courts (court in curia, the sejm 
court, and tribunals) were a source of land law. It may be presumed that 
they filled a tremendous gap in that law. After all, each researcher study-
ing land law is all too well aware of the very minor role that legislative 
acts played in its development. Following some sweeping undertakings 
in the fourteenth (the statutes of Kazimierz Wielki) and the fifteenth cen-
tury (the Statute of Warka of 1423 and others), legislative activity in the 
area of court law, especially where civil law was concerned, began to 
wane and die down. It had never been intense, nor was it dogmatic; it 
failed to regulate all elements of particular legal institutions in an ex-
haustive and accurate fashion. 
In the sixteenth century, legislation in the domain of court law is 
nothing short of negligible. “A highly negative phenomenon that one 
observes”, Stanisław Estreicher noted, “is stagnation in the field of liti-
gation, criminal, and private law. Constitutions of the Sejm say virtu-
ally nothing about this area of law.”210 Estreicher refers to the sixteenth 
century, when such constitutions were concerned with law more often. 
What would he have said about the seventeenth century in that case? An 
examination of Volumina Legum for the period from 1601 to 1668 (the 
subsequent years are unlikely to improve the picture) yields only several 
acts pertaining to civil law, all of which carry little importance from the 
standpoint of legal dogmatics.211 Seventeenth-century Poland—though 
209 Cf. p. 8 above. 
210 S. Estreicher, op.cit., p. 117.
211 I have counted 12 in total: 1 . Cudzoziemcy dóbr ziemskich kupować nie mają, VL II, p. 304, 
f. 1510, 1601; 2. Ordynacja Jaśnie Wielmożnych Myszkowskich, VL II, p. 396. f. 1515–
1516, 1601; 3. Ordynacja J. W. Janusza księcia Ostrogskiego, kasztelana krakowskiego, 
VL II, p. 466, f. 1668, 1609; 4. Miasta, aby dóbr ziemskich nie kupowały, VL III, p. 11, f. 4, 
1611; 5. Indemnitas ludzi młodych w województwie sandomierskim, VL III, p. 141, f. 289, 
1616; 6. O dobrach ziemskich dziedzicznych, VL III, p. 319, f. 666. 1631; 7. O preskrypcji 
dóbr szlacheckich przeciw duchownym,VL III, p. 378, f. 797 - 798, 1633; 8. De prole ille-
gitima, VL III, p. 385, f. 812, 1633; 9. Ordynacja Rzeczypospolitej dóbr ziemskich dziedzic-
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not exclusively—was a legislative wasteland, deprived almost entirely 
of legislative regulation in the domain of civil law (and, in a broader ap-
proach, court law).212 There were no new developments and everything 
relied on custom and communis praxis, as Jan Łączyński stated towards 
the end of the sixteenth century in the observation cited at the beginning 
of this paper. By and large, communis praxis meant a judicature whose 
precedents served to rectify the deficiencies of the law, and offered solu-
tions to casus novi (nova emergentia). 
A hundred years ago Oswald Balzer wrote that between the sixteenth 
and the eighteenth century “the provisions pertaining to court law are 
[…] exceptional and can be easily counted, including those which are 
concerned with minor details.”213 We seem to have forgotten recently 
about that legislative drought in Poland of the past centuries214 which, 
besides custom, paved the way for a broad application of legal rules 
established by courts, whose contribution to past Polish law was signifi-
cant and by no means insubstantial.215 
znych, VL III, p. 405, f. 854–856, 1635; 10. O widerkauffach, VL III, p. 406, f. 856–857, 
1635; 11. Declaratio preskrypcji w dobrach duchownych (VL III, p. 443, f. 933, 1638); 
12. O kuratoriach, VL III, p. 452, f. 002, 1638.
212 The researcher of historical land law in Poland will not find a single institution of civil law 
which owed its existence solely to normative acts.
213 O. Balzer, Uwagi o prawie, p. 106, similarly in the study entitled O obecnym stanie nauki 
prawa polskiego i jej potrzebach, in: Studia nad prawem polskim, Poznań 1889, p. 58.
214 Z. Kaczmarczyk, Historia państwa i prawa Polski, 2nd edition, vol. II, Warszawa 1966, 
pp. 17, 185, argued that constitutions played a major role in the development of court law 
in the Nobles’ Commonwealth, but his assessment, presuming constitutions to be the fun-
damental source of law is exaggerated. J. Bardach followed in his footsteps, claiming that 
enacted law predominated in that respect. J. Bardach, B. Leśnodorski, M. Pietrzak, Historia 
państwa i prawa polskiego, Warszawa 1976, p. 193.
215 A similar view was espoused by O. Balzer, Uwagi o prawie, op.cit., pp. 106–107 110–111. In 
contrast, S. Estreicher attributed a minimal role to precedents, op.cit., pp. 68, 79, 101, 116.
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